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Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to make a remark about the relation between (i) dualities
between theories, as ‘duality’ is understood in physics and (ii) equivalence of theories, as
‘equivalence’ is understood in logic and philosophy. The remark is that in physics, two
theories can be dual, and accordingly get called ‘the same theory’, though we interpret
them as disagreeing—so that they are certainly not equivalent, as ‘equivalent’ is normally
understood. So the remark is simple: but, I shall argue, worth stressing—since often
neglected.
My argument for this is based on the account of duality developed by De Haro: which
is illustrated here with several examples, from both elementary physics and string theory.
Thus I argue that in some examples, including in string theory, two dual theories disagree
in their claims about the world.
I also spell out how this remark implies a limitation of proposals (both traditional and
recent) to understand theoretical equivalence as either logical equivalence or a weakening
of it.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Prospectus: the Remark and the Implication
In recent philosophy of physics, there has been a surge of interest in two topics:
(i) how best to understand dualities between physical theories;
(ii) how best to individuate physical theories, and so how best to define theories
being equivalent.
These topics are closely related, since all agree that a duality is a matter of two theories
being in some sense ‘the same’. But the main aim of this paper is to stress that in physics,
two theories can be dual, and accordingly get called ‘the same theory’, though we interpret
them as disagreeing—so that they are certainly not equivalent, as ‘equivalent’ is normally
understood, both in everyday language and in philosophy.
I will establish this point—I shall say Remark—by: (a) reporting the account of duality
in physics, developed by De Haro (2016, 2016a), which I endorse and which we (2017)
call a ‘Schema’ (Sections 2 and 3); and then (b) supporting the Schema with examples
from classical and quantum physics, some of which illustrate the Remark (Section 4).
As we shall see in these examples, two dual theories can ‘disagree’ in either of two
ways: either
(Contr): by the theories making contrary assertions about a common subject-
matter; (they may well agree on some claims, but they contradict each other over other
claims); or
(Diff): by the theories describing different subject-matters (though the descriptions
are ‘isomorphic’ or ‘matching’—hence the duality).
In Section 3, I will make precise the notion of a subject-matter: (although for most of
the paper this precision is not needed, it will be useful in Section 6). I also agree that (Diff)
hardly merits the label ‘disagreement’, since both theories could be true. But ‘disagree’
is just my convenient umbrella term. The main point is the same, for either (Contr) or
(Diff): in both situations, one would not say that the dual theories are ‘equivalent’, on
any normal understanding.
Establishing the Remark leaves two tasks that will occupy the second half of the paper.
First, I spell out an Implication of the Remark: namely, a limitation of proposals (both
traditional and recent) to understand theoretical equivalence either as logical equivalence
or as a weakening of it (Section 5). In short: two disagreeing dual theories might be
formalised so as to be logically equivalent. And this implies that logical equivalence is
too weak an explication of theoretical equivalence—as is, therefore, any of the recently
proposed weakenings of logical equivalence.
Second, I briefly discuss the Remark’s application to dualities in string theory (Section
6). Of course, this is a vast topic, which I cannot properly address. But my having
established the Remark with examples from elementary (classical and quantum) physics
prompts the question: Do dualities in more advanced physics, in particular in string
theory, also illustrate it?
Indeed, this question is all the more pressing since (so far as De Haro and I know)
the one duality in advanced physics that has been exhibited in detail as an example of
our Schema (viz. bosonization, in De Haro and Butterfield 2017, Sections 4, 5) is, as
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it happens, a duality in which the two dual theories do not disagree in either of the
senses (Contr) or (Diff). Rather, they are both about a common subject-matter (viz. a
quantum field system in 1+1 dimensions, i.e. with space one-dimensional), about which
they say different but consistent things. Bosonization is thus a cousin—a very advanced
cousin!—of position-momentum duality in elementary quantum mechanics (cf. Section
4.2): in which the position and momentum descriptions do not disagree but say different
yet consistent things about a common subject-matter. In any case, Section 6 will argue
that Yes, some string-theoretic dualities do illustrate the Remark.
Thus the paper has three main stages. The first stage, Sections 2 to 4, establishes the
Remark, with elementary examples from physics. Though the examples are elementary,
the ‘tone’ is philosophy of physics, rather than of logic. In the second stage, Section
5, philosophy of logic comes to the fore. Indeed, readers interested more in logic than
in physics can read Section 5 without reading the details of Sections 2 to 4. The third
stage, Section 6, returns to philosophy of physics, with examples from string theory: ex-
amples which are, unfortunately, not as rigorously established as the elementary examples.
As we shall see, the Remark is, in essence, simple—‘elementary, my dear Watson’—in
two ways. First: it is illustrated by some familiar, indeed traditional, cases, which are
examples of our Schema for duality. An example of (Contr) will be different (i.e. con-
trary) specifications of absolute rest in Newtonian mechanics, set in Newtonian spacetime.
Examples of (Diff) will be: a “reworking” of position-momentum duality in quantum me-
chanics; and Kramers-Wannier duality in statistical mechanics. These will be Examples
(1), (2) and (3), in Section 4. Second: the Remark, and also the Implication, turn on
a familiar idea: that formal mathematical methods can only “discern structure”, and so
cannot “cut finer” than isomorphism, i.e. cannot distinguish isomorphic copies. The clas-
sification of an Example as a case of (Contr) (or of (Diff)) therefore goes beyond formal
matters such as isomorphism, and depends on interpretation.
This appeal to interpretation prompts two more general, but again familiar, morals of
what follows.
The first moral is about the need for judgment—and the difficulty of distinguishing
‘fact’ from ‘convention’. In logic class, we learn to respect the gap between formal logical
systems and arguments in natural language; and to admit that regimenting such an argu-
ment in a system requires some judgment-calls. Similarly here: aligning physical theories
with our formal definition of duality will require some judgments. These judgments will
impinge on whether we classify an Example as a case of (Contr); and the same goes for
(Diff). I am steadfast that I have classified my Examples correctly, by respecting the
intended meanings of the theories’ words. In Section 3, I will make ‘intended meaning’
more precise (viz. by endorsing the framework of intensional semantics). But I admit
to relying on intuition—or perhaps better: stipulation—about e.g. what a proponent of
Newtonian mechanics means by their word ‘absolute rest’, or what a proponent of statis-
tical mechanics means by ‘temperature’. But—as we will see—I think this is the best one
can do, thanks to lessons philosophers learnt some sixty years ago, from the troubles that
beset positivists’ attempts to sharply distinguish, within a scientific theory, ‘fact’ from
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‘convention’—its empirical claims from its conventional elements—once and for all.1
The second moral is broader. It is that, quite apart from the topic of dualities (and in
particular, De Haro’s and my account of them), a verdict that two theories are equivalent
depends on interpretation. ‘Theoretical equivalence’ is of course a term of art in the post-
positivist tradition, that takes ‘scientific theory’ as a unit of analysis and accepts some sort
of theory/observation distinction. In principle, you could define it however you wish. But
all hands agree that we need some notion of ‘theories making the very same claims about
the world, i.e. not only observational claims but also theoretical ones’. For one thing,
we need some such strengthening of the idea of observational (also known as: empirical)
equivalence, in order to articulate and then assess the under-determination of theory by
data, namely as a matter of observationally equivalent, but theoretically inequivalent,
theories. Here, the phrase ‘claims about the world’ obviously invokes interpretation. But
interpretation is liable to be vague, and even controversial, not least because of widespread
post-Quinean suspicion of meanings. Hence the long tradition of using formal ideas from
logic to try and give a precise explication of theoretical equivalence. The best-known
proposal takes theories in the traditional way as sets of sentences, and then defines logical
equivalence of theories, exactly as in a logic book.
But this cannot be right as an explication of theoretical equivalence, for three reasons:
each of which leads us back to interpretation. The first two are well-known; and the third
is the main idea of this paper’s Implication.
(1): Many philosophers reject the traditional construal of theories as sets of sen-
tences, usually by advocating the rival ‘semantic conception of theories’ (a view I will
touch on again in Section 5.2).
(2): For two theories to be logically equivalent, in the precise sense of a logic book,
they must be formulated in the very same vocabulary. And this is certainly too restric-
tive an explication of ‘making the very same claims about the world’, since two theories
could do that while using different vocabularies. Just think of classical electromagnetism
written in English and French. This second point has prompted the effort, in both logic
and philosophy, to give weaker definitions: that is, to define equivalence of theories more
weakly than (but as precisely as) the familiar logical equivalence. (I review this effort in
Section 5.3.)
(3): As I announced above, my Remark has an Implication that ‘goes in the op-
posite direction’ from this effort. For the Remark shows that logical equivalence is in
some cases too weak an explication of ‘making the very same claims about the world’.
Namely: dual pairs satisfying (Contr) or (Diff), once they are formalized (i.e. stated in a
formal language), may well be logically equivalent, and thereby equivalent in any weaker
sense—though, thanks to (Contr) or (Diff), they certainly do not ‘make the very same
claims about the world’.
Here, reasons (2) and (3) obviously form a complementary pair. (2) says that we
need to allow for synonymy, like ‘electric’ in English and ‘e´lectrique’ in French; and (3)
says that we need to allow for homonymy, like ‘bank’ in finance and beside a river. As I
said in the first moral above: I am steadfast that, though we need to exercise judgment,
1Here it is usual to cite Quine (1953). But I maintain that Quine was unfair to Carnap, and that
there are more persuasive rebuttals of making this a sharp distinction; cf. Putnam (1962), Stein (1992).
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in my Examples the facts about synonymy and homonymy are sufficiently objective to
make my Remark and Implication true.2
But though the Remark and Implication are simple, and these two general morals
familiar: they are worth stressing, for three reasons. First: simple though they are, most
of the recent philosophical literature on dualities and theoretical equivalence fails to state
them: which can be confusing. As we shall see, the confusion is closely related to confu-
sions that often occur when thinking about active vs. passive transformations: hence the
paper’s motto. Second: they provide the mental exercise of navigating the various con-
flicting usages of such words as ‘theory’, ‘model’, ‘equivalence’, and even ‘isomorphism’.
Third: since the interpretation of string-theoretic dualities is a central topic of the philo-
sophical literature on dualities, it is worth seeing that the Remark is illustrated by such
dualities, not just elementary ones. All the more so, since much of that literature denies
the Remark.
1.2 Relations to other work
To help introduce the paper, I comment on relations to other work. The first comment is
that this paper is a companion to De Haro (2016, 2016a): not just because these papers
state the Schema for duality (in their first Sections); but also because they emphasise
that dual theories can disagree (in my umbrella sense). In De Haro’s jargon: dual theories
are by definition theoretically equivalent: so note that for him, ‘theoretical equivalence’
does not mean ‘making the same claims about the world’. Yet, he says, dual theories
can make different, i.e. disagreeing, claims about the world—which he dubs their being
physically inequivalent. I agree with De Haro, though I shall keep to my jargon, including
my colloquial umbrella word ‘disagree’, and (Contr) and (Diff); (Section 5.1 gives my
rationale about jargon).
To see what this paper adds to De Haro’s work, note first that De Haro proposes
a sufficient condition for one to be justified in interpreting two duals to be physically
equivalent (in his sense). This sufficient condition has two conjuncts. The first is that
each dual is unextendable: which means, roughly speaking, that the dual, i.e. the theory,
both is a complete description of its intended domain and cannot be extended to a larger
domain. The second is that each dual has an internal (as against external) interpretation:
2Of course, I am not alone in stressing that verdicts of theoretical equivalence depend on interpretation.
Coffey (2014) argues for this (partly by citing philosophers disagreeing about putative examples: his
Sections 2, 3). I agree with him in spirit; (though not in letter—I disagree with his treatment of examples,
and I do not share his post-Quinean anxiety about meanings (pp. 835, 838)). A closer kindred spirit is van
Fraassen, especially in his reply (2014) to Halvorson’s critique (2012) of the semantic view of theories. Van
Fraassen’s Section 2 stresses the indispensability of interpretation. In particular, he says: ‘the identity
of a theory [cannot] be defined in terms of the corresponding set of mathematical structures without
reference to their representational function’ (p. 278). And more specifically, van Fraassen prefigures
my reason (3) about homonymy: ‘if the same diffusion equation is presented to describe gas diffusion,
and, elsewhere, temperature distribution over time, would anyone think that one and only one theory
was being presented?’ (p. 279). He also says the point is familiar: ‘these sorts of examples had ample
discussion in familiar literature’ (ibid.). As I say in the main text: I agree—but maintain that nowadays,
it is still worth stressing, especially in connection with dualities.
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i.e. an interpretation that does not proceed by coupling to another theory, often one which
describes measurements of the given theory’s domain. These conjuncts are linked in that
De Haro argues that unextendability implies that one is justified in using an internal
interpretation: (justified but not obliged—there can still be external interpretations).
So to summarize: De Haro proposes that unextendability justifies (but does not force)
internality; and the two together, applied to the duals of a duality, justify interpreting
the duals as physically equivalent: (De Haro 2016, Sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2; 2016a, Sections
1.3.1, 1.3.3; 2017, Section 2.4.1).3
I do not need more details about this proposal (sympathetic though I am). I need
only note that, as De Haro also stresses, it is putative ‘theories of everything’ (TOEs),
‘toy cosmologies’, i.e. theories of an entire possible world, that are, or can best claim
to be, unextendable. So, since string theories are usually presented as TOEs (although
perhaps not as ‘final theories’, whatever that might mean!), De Haro goes on to discuss
string-theoretic dualities, especially gauge/gravity duality, exploring the details of physical
equivalence and internal interpretations (in his senses). (Section 6.2 will say a bit more,
but his main interpretative discussions are: 2016, Sections 2.1, 2.3; 2016a, Sections 2, 3;
2017, Section 2.)
I can now state what this paper adds to De Haro’s results, in three points. First, it
is worth seeing that dual theories can disagree (for De Haro: be physically inequivalent),
in simple examples (Section 4). For then the Remark is not hidden in the technicalia of
advanced physics; (nor, I might add, is it threatened by most string-theoretic dualities
being not yet rigorously proven, and thereby questionable). Second, there is the Remark’s
Implication: a cautionary moral about the limits of formal methods, independent of ad-
vanced physics (Section 5). Third, when I do turn to string theory, I will argue that for
two dualities, viz. gauge/gravity duality (Section 6.2) and T-duality (Section 6.3), the two
dual theories disagree—in the straightforward ‘contradiction’ sense of (Contr). To put
it more modestly: I will argue that this view of the duals is tenable—as tenable as was
Newton’s and Clarke’s view that two different specifications of absolute rest contradict
each other.
This brings me to this paper’s relations to other recent literature about dualities. Here,
I will just expand on the first and third of my three reasons, at the end of Section 1.1,
for stressing the Remark. (I will later cite some specific connections: about (a) examples
like the harmonic oscillator (Section 2.3), and Lagrangian vs. Hamiltonian mechanics
(Section 4.5); and (b) recent logical work on theoretical equivalence (Section 5.3).)
These two reasons are linked. The reason why most of this literature omits the Re-
mark (and so its Implication) is that it concentrates on dualities in string theories: which,
as I mentioned, are usually presented as TOEs. Thus several authors hold that dualities
for TOEs (‘toy cosmologies’) must be taken as making the same claims about the world:
as ‘agreeing’, in my jargon—though often called by them, as by De Haro, ‘physically
3Two remarks. (1): The last reference speaks of internal vs. external ‘viewpoints’, rather than
‘interpretations’: so also do Dieks et al. (2015: Section 3.3.2). (2): De Haro does not invoke the
framework of intensional semantics, as I will in Section 3. But his proposed sufficient condition being,
not for physical equivalence simpliciter, but for one being justified in such an interpretation, reflects his
taking physical equivalence to be a matter of interpretation, outstripping formal methods.
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equivalent’. Of course, the details vary. Some authors do not use the phrase ‘physical
equivalence’ (or ‘theoretical equivalence’) precisely; and they do not articulate De Haro’s
idea of an internal interpretation as a way of vetoing two duals being about isomorphic
but distinct subject-matters. But there is a common intuitive idea: roughly speaking,
that for two dual TOEs, there is literally ‘no room in the cosmos’ for them to have sepa-
rate but isomorphic subject-matters. Here are three examples:
(a): Rickles says ‘dual descriptions are not in competition for ‘physical real-
ity’: rather they are to be considered as complementary descriptions of one and the same
physical situation’ (2011: 55), and ‘theories are said to be dual when they generate the
same physics’ (2011: 56). And again in later work: ‘we can take both descriptions to be
describing the same physical situation using different concepts’ (2013: 319); ‘there is no
competition between dual descriptions, and the incompatibility can be transformed away
in a certain sense ... dualities are examples of equivalent descriptions simpliciter’ (2017:
63 and passim).
(b): Matsubara (2013: Section 4.1, p. 477-478) requires dual theories to be
physically equivalent, viz. by requiring any differences between them not to be matters
of empirical interpretation, nor choices of coordinates or gauge (or at least not obviously
so);
(c): Huggett (2017: 86) says ‘the case of dual total theories is clearly one in
which the putative differences are ‘hidden’ in a very strong sense ...[so that] at least from a
practical, scientific point of view, it makes sense to treat those differences as non-physical
... In other words, long established, well-motivated scientific reasoning should lead us to
think that dual total theories represent the same physical situation.’4
So to sum up this paper’s relation to these authors: I will deny this consensus. For
Section 6 will urge that even in string theory, the two dual theories disagree. Or more
modestly: this view of the duals is tenable—as tenable as was Newton’s and Clarke’s view
that two different specifications of absolute rest contradict each other.
I of course agree that even for TOEs, the literature is not unanimous. A laudable
exception to the consensus—a close cousin of my own position—is Read (2016), and Read
and Mo¨ller-Nielsen (2018). The first of these is about string-theoretic dualities. It gives a
nuanced roster of interpretative options, and seems to favour a combination of them (2016:
224-225, 232), rather than saying that duals always agree, i.e. are physically equivalent
(his options 2 and 3, explored on pp. 227-230). The second paper relates our topic—
do some duals disagree?—to a proposed distinction between two general approaches to
symmetries and dualities, called the ‘interpretational approach’, and the ‘motivational
approach’ (a distinction proposed by Mo¨ller-Nielsen (2017)). The broad idea is that
‘interpretationalists’ infer confidently from the mere existence of a symmetry or duality
to agreement, i.e. physical equivalence; but ‘motivationalists’ are cautious: they say that
only once a common ontology is formulated, should one infer agreement.
Thus Read and Mo¨ller-Nielsen are cautious motivationalists. Their position is ob-
4Agreed: these authors also note that in some dualities, away from string theory or TOEs, the duals
have different subject-matters. For example, Matsubara (2013: Section 4.2.1, p. 478) and Huggett (2017:
86) note this for an elementary harmonic oscillator duality—which I will discuss in Section 2.3.
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viously a cousin of mine—and I dare say, of De Haro’s: as is clear from their helpful
comparison of various positions (their Section 5.3). But I will not go into detail. For: (i)
their definition of duality is different (roughly speaking: weaker) than De Haro’s and mine
(in our Schema); and (ii) their ‘interpretational vs. motivational’ distinction concerns the
heuristic functions of duality for guessing a better theory ‘behind’ the two duals—functions
which I will mostly set aside. But I will agree that these functions are very important:
(cf. my warning Beware in Section 4.1, its footnote 10, item (5) in Section 6.2, and De
Haro (2018)). Indeed, these functions will suggest a diagnosis of why the false consensus
above gelled: i.e. why my Remark has been missed. In short: the diagnosis is that the
authors are using the duality to guess a better theory ‘behind’ the duals, rather than (like
me) interpreting dual theories as now formulated.
2 A Schema for duality
In this Section and the next, I review our account of duality (Sections 2.1, 2.2), compare it
with the notion of symmetry (Section 2.3), and relate it to ideas of interpretation (Section
3). This account has been developed mainly by De Haro (2016: Section 1, 2016a: Section
1), but also more fully by us together (2017: Sections 2, 3): (and foreshadowed in De
Haro, Teh, and Butterfield (2017: Section 3)). As a mnemonic, we label this account a
Schema. It will be clear that our Schema is logically weak, so that there are countless
examples, including elementary ones: a topic taken up in Section 3.3.
2.1 The idea
De Haro and I say that a duality is an isomorphism of theories. More precisely: duality
is a matter of:
(a): the two given theories sharing a common core; the common core is itself a theory,
which we call a bare theory; (it is usually best to think of the bare theory as uninterpreted,
or abstract: though it may be interpreted); and
(b): the two given theories being isomorphic models of this common core: that is, iso-
morphic as regards the structure of the bare theory. The two dual i.e. isomorphic theories
will be called model triples, the ‘triple’ referring to the fact that the theory consists of
three items: a state-space S, a set of quantities Q, and a dynamics D.
Here, a model is a specific realization—one might say ‘version’ or ‘formulation’—of
a theory. That is: it ‘models’ (verb!) another theory, viz. the bare theory: usually in
the sense of representation theory (in the mathematical sense of ‘representation theory’—
‘representation’ being another word with confusingly diverse uses, in mathematics and in
philosophy).
So: Beware: the word ‘model’ often has three connotations that are for our Schema
misleading. That is: the word ‘model’, as contrasted with ‘theory’, often connotes:
(i): a specific solution (at a single time: or for all times, i.e. a possible history)
for the physical system concerned, whereas the ‘theory’ encompasses all solutions—and
in many cases, for a whole class of systems;
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(ii): an approximation, in particular an approximate solution, whereas the ‘theory’
deals with exact solutions;
(iii): an interpretation, and even being part of the physical world (in particular,
being empirical, and-or observable); whereas the ‘theory’ stands in need of interpretation,
and is of course not part of the physical world.
So NB: our use of ‘model’ denies all three connotations.
A standard piece of physics jargon can also be misleading: namely, calling a duality’s
correspondence between items—the mapping of a state or quantity in one dual theory
to the other—a dictionary. Philosophers, beware: the ‘dictionary’ need not be faithful
to meanings. Items that it pairs can have very different meanings. Indeed: this will be
crucial to cases of (Contr) and (Diff), and thus to the Remark and Implication.
A rigorous but advanced example of this Schema is: bosonization, a duality between
two quantum field theories in two spacetime dimensions: one with bosons, and one with
fermions. So here: a bosonic model triple is isomorphic (by a unitary equivalence) to
a fermionic model triple, their common core being a certain infinite-dimensional algebra
(2017: Sections 4, 5). Given how different bosons and fermions are, this is a remarkable,
indeed very surprising, isomorphism. But as it happens: it is not a case of (Contr) or
(Diff).
2.2 Details of the Schema: duality as isomorphism of model
triples
It is clearest to have a notation in which the model triple, comprising the state-space
S, the set of quantities Q, and the dynamics D: (i) is separated from the model’s own
specific structure, and (ii) expresses only the model’s realizing (typically: representing in
the mathematical sense) the bare theory T . Thus we write a model M of T as
M = 〈SM ,QM ,DM , M¯〉 =: 〈m, M¯〉 , (1)
where: m := 〈SM ,QM ,DM〉 is the model triple; and M¯ is the specific structure, the
‘details’, that a model adds to its bare theory.
But note that m is usually built by using the specific structure M¯ . So it should not
be thought of as given independently of M¯ ; and one should not think of M as just the
ordered pair of independently given m and M¯ . Rather, m encodes M ’s representing the
bare theory T . So one might well write TM instead of m, since having a subscript M on the
right hand side of the equation M = 〈TM , M¯〉 signals that M is not such an ordered pair.
In other words: the notation TM emphasises that the model triple: (i) is a representation
of T , (ii) is built from M ’s specific structure viz. M¯ , and (iii) is itself a theory (hence the
letter ‘T’).
To repeat Section 2.1’s warning against misleading connotations of the word ‘model’:
the specific structure or details, M¯ , are not a matter of specifying: (i) a solution or history
of the system; or (ii) approximation(s); or (iii) interpretation(s). Rather, the extra details
are extra mathematical structure: just like a representation of a group or an algebra has
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extra details or structure, beyond that of the group or algebra of which it is a represen-
tation.
It is clear that two model triples that model a bare theory are in general not isomor-
phic to each other, nor to the bare theory: in the relevant sense of ‘isomorphic’, viz. given
by the bare theory. (The situation is just like in representation theory.) So the assertion
of duality is substantive: it asserts that two model triples are in fact isomorphic.
Before formally defining duality as isomorphism, we sketch how states, quantities and
dynamics will be treated. Suppose we are given a set of states S, a set of quantities Q
and a dynamics D: 〈S,Q,D〉. We will write 〈Q, s〉 for the value of quantity Q in state s.
It is these values that are to be suitably preserved by the duality, i.e. by the isomorphism
of model triples: cf. eq. 6 below.
For classical physics, one naturally takes quantities as real-valued functions on states,
so that 〈Q, s〉 := Q(s) ∈ IR is the system’s possessed or intrinsic value, in state s, of
the quantity Q. For quantum physics, one naturally takes quantities as linear operators
on a Hilbert space of states, so that 〈Q, s〉 := 〈s|Qˆ|s〉 ∈ IR is the system’s Born-rule
expectation value of the quantity. (But in fact, for quantum dualities, the duality often
preserves off-diagonal matrix elements 〈s1|Qˆ|s2〉 ∈ |C: cf. below.)
As to dynamics, here assumed deterministic:— This can be presented in two ways, for
which we adopt the quantum terminology, viz. the ‘Schro¨dinger’ and ‘Heisenberg’ pictures;
(though the ideas occur equally in classical physics). We will adopt for simplicity the
Schro¨dinger picture. So we say: DS is an action of the real line IR representing time on
S.
There is an equivalent Heisenberg picture of dynamics with DH , an action of IR rep-
resenting time on Q. The pictures are related by, in an obvious notation:
DS : IR×S 3 (t, s) 7→ DS(t, s) =: s(t) ∈ S iff DH : IR×Q 3 (t, Q) 7→ DH(t, Q) =: Q(t) ∈ Q
(2)
where for all s ∈ S considered as the initial state, and all quantities Q ∈ Q, the values of
physical quantities at the later time t agree in the two pictures:
〈Q, s(t)〉 = 〈Q(t), s〉 . (3)
We can now present our Schema for duality as an isomorphism between model triples.
LetM1,M2 be two models, with model triplesm1 = 〈SM1 ,QM1 ,DM1〉 andm2 = 〈SM2 ,QM2 ,DM2〉.
We can suppose that M1,M2 are both models of a bare theory T .
To say that the model triples m1,m2 are isomorphic is to say, in short, that: there are
isomorphisms between their respective state-spaces and sets of quantities, that
(i) make values match, and
(ii) are equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics (in the Schro¨dinger and Heisen-
berg pictures, respectively).
Thus these maps are our rendering of physics jargon’s dictionary.
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Thus we say:— A duality between m1 = 〈SM1 ,QM1 ,DM1〉 and m2 = 〈SM2 ,QM2 ,DM2〉
requires:
(1): an isomorphism between the state-spaces (almost always: Hilbert spaces, or
for classical theories, manifolds):
ds : SM1 → SM2 using d for ‘duality’ ; and (4)
(2): an isomorphism between the sets (almost always: algebras) of quantities
dq : QM1 → QM2 using d for ‘duality’ ; (5)
such that: (i) the values of quantities match:
〈Q1, s1〉1 = 〈dq(Q1), ds(s1)〉2 , ∀Q1 ∈ QM1 , s1 ∈ SM1 . (6)
and: (ii) ds is equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics, DS:1, DS:2, in the Schro¨dinger
picture; and dq is equivariant for the two triples’ dynamics, DH:1, DH:2, in the Heisenberg
picture: see Figure.
SM1 ds−−→ SM2yDS:1 yDS:2
SM1 ds−−→ SM2
QM1
dq−−→ QM2yDH:1 yDH:2
QM1
dq−−→ QM2
Figure 1: Equivariance of duality and dynamics, for states and quantities.
Eq. 6 appears to favour m1 over m2; but in fact does not, thanks to the maps d being
bijections.
De Haro and I have related this Schema, in some detail, to various topics such as (a)
the idea of symmetry, (b) the construction of theories by abstraction from models, and
(c) the interpretation of theories; (cf. 2017, Sections 3.1, 2.4, 2.3, 3.2.3.) For this paper,
I only need to review (a) the idea of symmetry (Section 2.3) and (c) the interpretation of
theories (Section 3). The latter will make precise the idea of a subject-matter; and this
will lead in to presenting examples of the Remark (Section 4).
2.3 Symmetries of a theory: self-dualities
The main connection between this Schema and the idea of symmetry is straightforward.
For if we set aside the bare theory, and the specific structure of the two models, we have,
up to isomorphism, just one model triple. Therefore, the conditions (i) and (ii) in Section
2.2’s definition of duality become the usual definition of a symmetry of a theory: i.e. a
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dynamical symmetry, that transforms a dynamically possible history into another ‘replica’
history.5
But there are two further points to make. (1): The first is to note that we often
regard a state and its transform under a symmetry as physically distinct. This is a very
simple point, and I will illustrate it with a very simple example: rotation in space. But
it clearly illustrates the broad theme that will underpin the Remark: viz., items can have
the same description but be physically distinct. (2): The second point concerns the jargon
of ‘self-duality’, and illustrates the same theme.
(1): Consider the rotational symmetry of Newtonian point-particle mechanics with
a rotationally invariant Hamiltonian (say, N particles mutually gravitating). Thus if
we rotate a configuration about an axis by some angle, we get another configuration:
it is a ‘replica’, apart from orientation in space. Similarly, if we rotate a state (i.e.
a configuration together with velocity/momentum information): we get another state;
and thanks to the determinism towards both past and future, we get a rotated total
history (where ‘history’ means trajectory through the state-space)—a ‘replica’ of the
unique history through the original state. (Of course, an arbitrary translation through
space give a similar example, assuming a translationally invariant Hamiltonian.)
This example will be covered in more general terms in Section 4 (Example (1) and,
in fancier language, Example (5)). But we can already see the point. Namely: it is not
mandatory to say that rotation is ‘gauge’, that there should be no physical difference
between the original state/history and the rotated one. Agreed: you might wish to say
this, especially if the N particles are the entire material contents of the universe, so that
the rotation of all of them is not observable by any means (since there are no other
bodies in the universe). Here, we are of course back to the debate between absolute and
relational conceptions of space: paradigmatically between Newton and Clarke advocating
the absolute conception, and Leibniz advocating the relational conception.6
I do not need to adopt any view in this debate. I only need to point out that nei-
ther side has been agreed to be the victor. Thus it is not mandatory to ‘join Leibniz’.
In other words: Newton’s and Clarke’s views are tenable. And according to them: here
is a case of physically distinct states with, in a perfectly good sense, ‘the same description’.
(2): A symmetry of a theory is sometimes called a self-duality: though this label is
not used for spacetime symmetries like rotational or translational symmetry of Newtonian
gravitation. Two examples where the label is used are: (i) the classical harmonic oscillator
in one spatial dimension, and (ii) classical vacuum electromagnetism. It will be enough to
present these informally, without specifying precisely the sets S,Q of states and quantities.
Again, my point will be that here we have unproblematically distinct states—in my jargon:
‘the duals disagree’. (As I mentioned in footnote 4, other authors agree on these examples:
Matsubara (2013: 478), Huggett (2017: 86) and Dieks et al. (2015: 209).)
(i): The harmonic oscillator, with H = p
2
2m
+ 1
2
mω2x2. Define d ≡ ds on the (x, p)
5Cf. 2017, Sections 3.1, 3.2.4. The latter, and that paper’s item (4) in its Section 2.1, compare
dualities with the idea of ‘gauge’. Note that Rickles (2017) argues that dualities are strongly analogous
to ‘gauge’.
6Of course, when there are other bodies, both sides agree that the rotation is not ‘gauge’.
13
plane IR2 by
d : x 7→ p
mω
; p 7→ −mωx . (7)
Then d(H) = H, i.e. d preserves the ellipses of equal energy in the (x, p) plane: d combines
a clockwise rotation by pi
2
with a re-scaling (viz. dilation by mω and contraction by 1
mω
).
But NB: there is no temptation to identify a state 〈x, p〉 and its image d(〈x, p〉). If
describing this harmonic oscillator as in 〈x, p〉 at time t0 is accurate, then describing it as
in d(〈x, p〉) is plain wrong!
So again, this is a case of: ‘Newton and Clarke’s views are tenable’. Indeed, I would
say that they are tenable, even if the harmonic oscillator was the only system in the
universe. That is: it is tenable to say, for a ‘lonely’ harmonic oscillator at a certain time,
that if describing it as in 〈x, p〉 at time t0 is accurate, then describing it as in d(〈x, p〉)
would be plain wrong.
(ii): In classical vacuum electromagnetism, the map
d : E 7→ −B ; B 7→ E . (8)
maps solutions of Maxwell’s equations to solutions, i.e. is a symmetry of the theory. (It
is also ‘squares to minus 1’, i.e. d2 = −1.)
But again: ‘Newton and Clarke’s views are tenable’. It is not mandatory to say there
is no physical difference between an argument-solution, i.e. an assignment of E and B
throughout Minkowski spacetime M, and the image-solution defined by applying d. In
the argument-solution, here at p ∈ M, there is, say, E(p) = (5, 4, 3) ∈ IR3 in some carte-
sian coordinates; in the image-solution, instead, we have B(p) = (−5,−4,−3) ∈ IR3 in
those cartesian coordinates. That looks to be a physical difference.7
3 Interpreting physical theories
‘Interpreting physical theories’ is a large subject, at the intersection of logic, especially
semantics, and philosophy of science. In this Section, I undertake three tasks. I report my
endorsement of intensional semantics (Section 3.1). Then I report how that framework
makes precise the notion of subject-matter—and thereby, Section 1’s two ‘ways to disagree’,
(Contr) and (Diff) (Section 3.2). The “shape” of my Remark will then be clear (Section
3.3).
7Again: I agree that these ‘absolutist’ views, though tenable, can be denied. They stand accused of
drawing a distinction where there is no difference: more precisely, of claiming, controversially, that there
are, or can be, in-principle-unobservable differences. In philosophy, the claims have labels. Claiming
such differences between objects, say the spatial points in (1)’s rotation example, is called haecceitism.
Claiming such differences between properties, say the electric and magnetic fields in example (2: ii), is
called quidditism: a claim that is less often denied than is haecceitism—but with arguments to confront
(Black 2000). As I said at the end of Section 1.2: I take up the discussion in Section 4.1 and in (5) at
the end of Section 6.2.
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3.1 Intensional semantics
This is the framework for analysing the meanings of words and sentences, developed by
such authors as Carnap, Montague and Lewis, that combines Frege’s distinction between
sense and reference with the tradition, from Leibniz to modern modal logic, of a set of
possible worlds, i.e. all the ways the universe could be, only one of which is actual.
At its simplest: a singular term such as ‘the Earth’s tallest building’ has an intension
(a Fregean sense) that is a partial function on the set W of worlds mapping a world
w ∈ W to the term’s extension (reference) in w—in the example, to the tallest building
on Earth, in w. And if w has no Earth, or Earth in w has no buildings, then the function
is undefined. Similarly, a predicate such as ‘is made of steel’ has an intension that is a
function sending each world w to the predicate’s extension, i.e. set of instances, in w.
The semantics of sentences, both simple and compound, is then built up compositionally.
The intension of a sentence S is defined as the function sending a world w to 1 or 0,
according as S is true or false at w, as determined by the extensions at w of S’s parts.
So the intension of S is the characteristic function of the set of worlds where S is true;
and the extension of S at w is 1 or 0. Or equivalently: the intension of a sentence is the
set of worlds where it is true. Thus the intension of ‘and’ is the set-theoretic operation of
intersection among sets of worlds. And so on.
Although this framework was originally developed for formal languages in logic and
for (fragments of!) natural languages, it is readily adapted to physical theories with their
talk of systems, states and quantities, as in Section 2.2. Roughly speaking: systems are
objects, i.e. references of singular terms; quantities are relations of objects to numbers
(relative to a system of units); a state is a value-assignment to all the quantities that
apply to a given object; and a possible world is the total histories of the states of all the
objects in the world.
De Haro and I endorse this framework, especially in the version by Lewis (1970).
And our endorsement is not just in general: but as applied to Section 2.2’s conception of
theories, models and dualities. Thus the assignment of intensions and extensions to states
and quantities in model triples can be made precise in terms of interpretation maps. These
are partial functions on the sets of states and quantities, S and Q, into sets of intensions
(Fregean senses) or extensions (worldly referents). Details are given in (2017, Section 2.3;
and as applied to dual model triples, Section 3.2.3). But this paper does not need further
details about this framework, except in two regards.
(1): The framework has the great merit of respecting the meanings of words! It takes
there to be a fact about what is the correct intension of ‘the Earth’s tallest building’:
relative of course to various factors, such as choice of language, resolutions of vagueness,
context of utterance etc. That may seem to you a feature so obviously mandatory for an
endeavour calling itself ‘semantics’, that you may ask why I have stressed it. But as we
will see in Section 5, there are ‘semantics’ that investigate the mathematical consequences
of assigning arbitrary meanings (specifically, extensions) to words—viz. the semantics in
books of logic, and especially model theory!
Two qualifications about this trenchant remark ‘against logic’. (i): It will become
clear in Section 5 that this comment is meant as a cheeky appetizer for my argument,
rather than as a criticism of those books. Of course, logic and model theory teach us a
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great deal about semantics, broadly understood, by studying the consequences of assigning
arbitrary meanings. (ii): I agree that it is a good question, perhaps the central question of
philosophy of language, exactly what facts make true the correct assignment of intensions.
About this, I admire Lewis’ answer (1974, 1975, 1983: 370-377). I also admire Callender
and Cohen’s claim that we should analyse representation in science in terms drawn from
philosophy of language and mind (2006, especially Section 3). I also maintain that these
authors’ claims are compatible with Section 1.1’s two morals.
(2): Later on, it will be useful to deploy the framework’s precise notion of a subject-
matter, as a partition of the set W of worlds: to which I now turn.
3.2 Subject-matters: (Contr) and (Diff)
As so often, one cannot say it better than Lewis. He writes:
We can think of a subject matter, sometimes, as a part of the world: the
17th Century is a subject matter, and also a part of this world. Or better, we
can think of a subject matter as a part of the world in intension: a function
which picks out, for any given world, the appropriate part—as it might be,
that world’s 17th Century. (If for some reason the world had no 17th Century,
the function would be undefined.) We can say that two worlds are exactly
alike with respect to a given subject matter. For instance two worlds are alike
with respect to the 17th Century iff their 17th Centuries are exact intrinsic
duplicates (or if neither one has a 17th Century).
This being exactly alike is an equivalence relation. So instead of thinking of a
subject matter as a part of the world in intension, we can think of it instead
as the equivalence relation. This seems a little artificial. But in return it is
more general, because some subject matters—for instance, demography—do
not seem to correspond to parts of the world. [...]
The equivalence relation on worlds partitions the worlds into equivalence
classes. The equivalence classes are propositions, ways things might possi-
bly be. An equivalence class is a maximally specific way things might be with
respect to the subject matter. So a third way to think of a subject matter,
again general, is as the partition of equivalence classes. (1988: 111-112).
Thus the idea is that a subject-matter is a taxonomy or classification-scheme, so that
worlds that match exactly as regards the taxonomy are to be in the same cell of the
partition of W (the same equivalence class). Lewis goes on to discuss various ensuing
ideas and applications (1988: 112-117; cf. also 1988a: 136-141). I need only note three of
the ideas, and can set aside Lewis’ applications, interesting though they are. These three
ideas will enable me—after a brief skirmish with the quantum measurement problem—to
state (Contr) and (Diff) more precisely.
First: one subject-matter can contain, i.e. be more detailed than, another: like the
17th Century contains the 1680s, or the subject-matter, how many stars there are, con-
tains the subject-matter, whether there are finitely or infinitely many stars. In terms of
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partitions, this is a matter of the first partition being a refinement, or fine-graining, of
the second. That is: each cell of the second partition is a union of cells of the first. Thus
the bigger subject-matter, with more cells in its partition, is a refinement of the smaller.
Thus the set of subject-matters is partially ordered by ‘is a refinement of’. And in this
partially ordered set, one can consider least upper bounds and greatest lower bounds: i.e.
the ‘finest common coarse-graining’ and the ‘coarsest common fine-graining’ of a set of
subject-matters. Of course, subject-matters might form a very sparse subset of the set
of all partitions of W . So there need be no commitment to such bounds: in particular,
to a greatest lower bound of all subject-matters. And even if that greatest lower bound
exists, it need not be so dizzyingly fine as the set of all singletons of worlds in W .
Second: a proposition is about, i.e. entirely about, a subject-matter if its truth-value
is determined by the facts about the subject-matter: that is, if the set of worlds at which
it is true is a union of cells of the subject-matter. So if a proposition is about a subject-
matter, it is also about any bigger (more detailed, finer-grained) subject-matter. So we
cannot speak unequivocally of the subject-matter of a proposition.
Third: In general, of course, partitions cut across one another, in that neither is a
refinement of the other. That is: at least one cell of one partition overlaps, i.e. intersects,
two cells of the other. The extreme case, which Lewis calls the subject-matters being
orthogonal, is: each cell of each partition intersects each cell of the other. An example
might be: how many stars there are, as a subject-matter, is orthogonal to Queen Vic-
toria’s preferences about clothes. That is: any number of stars is compatible with any
sartorial tastes she could have had.
It is clear that even if you are suspicious of possible worlds, and-or of intentional
semantics, these ideas will be useful whenever you are concerned with various partitions
of some given set. For a philosopher of physics, the prototype is of course partitions of
the phase space Γ, in classical mechanics. Each quantity Q, taken as a real function on Γ,
defines a partition of Γ whose cells are its level surfaces (inverse images of Q’s values). So
Q defines a subject-matter. Taking a function, f(Q), of Q is, in general, a coarse-graining.
For in general, some two arguments of a function f yield the same value: so that at least
one cell of f(Q)’s partition is a union of cells from Q’s partition. This prototype also
gives examples of orthogonality in Lewis’ sense. For many classical mechanical systems,
any value of position for some given component of the system is compatible with any
value of its momentum, so that the component’s position and momentum are orthogonal
as subject-matters. Similarly, for the same quantity—position, say—on two different
components: each component can be anywhere, wherever the other is.
Similarly neat examples of subject-matters, and of these related ideas, will be evident
in Section 4’s elementary examples of dualities. Agreed, there will be the usual elephant
in the room: viz. the quantum measurement problem. More precisely: quantum theory’s
superposition principle, or non-commutativity of quantities. I shall set this aside; but we
should register the issues here.
Clearly, the ideas of a subject-matter as a partition of the possible worlds, and of
a quantity defining a partition of a classical phase space, fit well together. They are
‘Boolean cousins’. But adapting the latter to quantum physics yields the quantity’s spec-
tral family, i.e. its complete mutually orthogonal family of eigenspaces (equivalently: the
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corresponding projectors). This raises the question how all the countless superpositions
‘between’ different eigenspaces are to be included in any putative set of ‘worlds’. More
pointedly: in some quantum cases we will later classify as ‘different subject-matters’, e.g.
position and momentum (cf. Section 4.2), the spectral families ‘cut across’ one another
in a more radical, even weird, way than Lewis’ orthogonality, just mentioned. Namely:
for any two real intervals [a1, b1], [a2, b2] ⊂ IR, the position projector for [a1, b1], EQ1 say,
and the momentum projector for [a2, b2], E
P
2 say, have as their meet, E
Q
1 ∧ EP2 , i.e. the
intersection of their ranges, the zero subspace. That is: no state can be of compact sup-
port in both position and momentum. So here, the ‘cutting across’ is not just a matter
of a cell of one partition overlapping two from the other, i.e. an eigenspace of one family
having non-zero projections on two eigenspaces of the other family.
But these issues will make no difference to the arguments, and conclusions, of this
paper; and so I will not pause over them. All I need is to use the above summary of inten-
sional semantics and subject-matters, so as to give a more precise statement of Section 1’s
two ways that two theories can disagree, (Contr) and (Diff). Though these formulations
ignore the issues just raised, they will be precise enough for my purposes—and they will
dominate the rest of the paper.
In Section 1, I said that for (Contr): two dual theories make contrary assertions about
a common subject-matter, so that though they may agree on some claims, they contra-
dict one another over other claims. Given Section 2.2’s Schema, and the above account of
possible worlds, propositions and subject-matters: we think of conjoining the assertions
made by an interpreted model triple into a single proposition, which is made true by a set
of worlds. Since the interpreted model triple is about an intended subject-matter (such
as—to look ahead to Section 4.1—point particles, interacting by Newtonian gravity), this
set of worlds is a union of cells of the partition that is the subject-matter. Thus we have:
(Contr): Each of two dual model triples is interpreted as wholly true (its conjunc-
tive proposition is wholly true) at a union of cells of a common subject-matter. But these
two unions are disjoint: for the propositions contradict each other.
Similarly: in Section 1, I said that for (Diff): two dual theories describe different
subject-matters, though the descriptions are ‘isomorphic’ or ‘matching’—hence the du-
ality. Applying again the notions introduced above, this becomes: the two interpreted
model triples are about two different subject-matters (such as—to look ahead to Sections
4.2 and 4.3—position as against momentum, or low temperature as against high temper-
ature). And these subject-matters, i.e. partitions, cut across one another: maybe even in
the extreme sense Lewis dubbed ‘orthogonality’. Thus we have:
(Diff): Two dual model triples are interpreted as wholly true (the conjunctive
proposition of each is wholly true) at distinct sets of worlds. Each set is a union of cells
of the triple’s subject-matter, i.e. partition. But the partitions are different, and so are
the sets. The sets need not be disjoint: both the model triples could be, both of them,
wholly true. But the sets are distinct.
So much by way of making subject-matters, and thereby (Contr) and (Diff), more
precise. As I mentioned: for most of the paper, this precision is not needed. In particular,
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one can work with Section 1’s formulations of (Contr) and (Diff). But the precision will
be helpful when we come to string theory (Section 6).
3.3 Credo
The “shape” of my Remark is now clear. By invoking the intended meanings or interpre-
tations of physical theories, I will exhibit cases of (Contr) and (Diff). The isomorphisms
given by the duality (eq. 4 to 6) will not be “allowed” to rule out such cases by their
“carrying” meanings across to one dual from the other, i.e. their fixing the first dual’s
interpretation by leaning on the isomorphism so as to use an existing interpretation of
the second dual. For carrying meanings across in that way would violate the first dual’s
intended meaning.
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that two duals’ intended meanings are usually,
let alone always, different: not all pairs of duals disagree, in my umbrella sense. Indeed:
since Section 2.2’s definition of duality is formal, regardless of meanings, some pairs agree
“utterly”—agree in a stronger sense than do the duals in position-momentum duality,
or in bosonization. Thus consider a formulation of relativity theory with a (+,−,−,−)
signature for the metric, and another formulation with a (−,+,+,+) signature. (Thanks
to Thomas Barrett for pressing this example.) Prima facie, the first formulation says
that a particle’s worldline has positive length, the second that it has negative length. But
of course, everyone concurs that these formulations in no way disagree. The +/− in the
metric’s signature is a paradigm case of a ‘trivial convention’; and so the two formulations,
construed with their intended meanings, are indeed equivalent.
Should we then try to strengthen the definition of duality, so that such cases of “trivial
equivalence” are ruled out as not being dualities? I resist this project, because of the first
moral in Section 1.1. The project would require distinguishing ‘fact’ from ‘convention’
once and for all, across a whole range of theories (or if you prefer: formulations of theories).
And since at least sixty years ago, that has seemed like a mug’s game. So: better, say I,
to keep to a formal definition of duality, independent of interpretations; and to admit that
when classifying an example of it as the duals agreeing (‘equivalent’), or as disagreeing
((Contr) or (Diff)), we must exercise judgment about what best respects each dual’s
intended meaning.
Similar remarks apply in connection with the fact that our Schema is not just formal,
but logically weak. So it fits countless cases which would not normally be called ‘dualities’.
And countless such cases would not even be articulated at all—we need no special word
for isomorphic representations of any algebraic structure!
But De Haro and I think (2017, Sections 2.1, 3.2.2) that it is best to keep to a formal
and logically weak definition of ‘duality’, while admitting that of course, the scientific
interest of a duality depends on interpretative issues: in particular, the isomorphism
having such features as the following:
(i) being non-obvious, and-or
(ii) being of a logically strong structure (e.g. ‘10 dimensional Lie group’, not just
‘group’), and-or
(iii) having other scientific advantages: one important case being that the duality
renders the weak coupling, and therefore tractable, regime of one theory dual to the strong
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coupling, and therefore intractable, regime of the other—so that one can solve ‘easy’
problems in the tractable regime of the first theory so as to solve ‘hard’ i.e. intractable
problems in the second theory.8
Agreed: one might want to strengthen the definition of ‘duality’ by requiring such
features. As we shall see, feature (i) is often a matter of the notions that correspond
by the duality—say, the quantity Q on the ‘left’, Q ∈ QM1 , and its image dq(Q) on the
‘right’—being disparate. (Recall Section 2.1’s comment that a duality ‘dictionary’ need
not be faithful to meanings.) Thus: in one of Section 4’s examples, Q is position, while
dq(Q) is momentum; and in another example, Q is free energy at a low temperature, while
dq(Q) is free energy at a corresponding high temperature.
But it is impossible to be precise about amounts of disparateness, or non-obviousness:
or of logical strength. So again: I resist this project of strengthening the definition,
because of the morals in Section 1.1. In any case, this paper’s project does not need any
such strengthening: though, as we shall see, the examples that exemplify the Remark
have (or, as a matter of history: once had) most of the features (i) to (iii).
So much by way of a credo about what is worth making make precise (even formal),
and what is best left to judgment in each case. I now turn to elementary examples of the
Schema ...
4 Examples in classical and quantum physics
In this Section, I present five Examples, (1) to (5), of the Schema. Of these, just two, viz.
(2) and (3), are usually called ‘dualities’. And I will concentrate on the first three, which
exemplify the Remark. The Remark will be evident: two dual theories can disagree, in
one of the two ways, (Contr) and (Diff). They can contradict one another about the
same subject-matter, or they can be about different subject-matters (indeed: orthogonal
subject-matters, in Lewis’ sense).
I will only sketch these Examples. There will be two main limitations of scope. First:
it will be clear that there are choices to be made about what exactly is the bare theory,
and thus the notion of representation in play in defining the models/duals, i.e. in defining
the model triples and their specific structure. But we will not need to make very precise
choices, in order to illustrate the Schema adequately: and in particular, to exemplify the
Remark. Second: I will downplay the role of dynamics, i.e. eq. 1: partly to save space,
and partly because in some Examples, dynamics ‘drops out’ from the discussion. (For
more detail about these Examples, cf. Butterfield and De Haro (2018).)
But although the Examples are only sketched, one can check that for each of them,
most or even all of Section 3.3’s features (i) to (iii) about scientific interest hold—or, as
a matter of history, once held. That is: the equivalence/duality:
(i) is non-obvious (or rather: it was non-obvious at a certain historical epoch!);
8These three desiderata are of course widely endorsed, though often with different labels: like ‘Striking’
and ‘Useful’ in De Haro, Teh, and Butterfield (2017: Section 2)). Thus the famous duality, bosonization,
on which our (2017) concentrated, has all of them. Here, we return to dualities’ heuristic importance for
guessing new theories, which I mentioned at the end of Section 1.2: and will take up again in Sections
4.1 and 6.2.
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(ii) is of logically strong structures (or rather: the structures seemed logically
strong at a certain historical epoch—before the further development of physics made, e.g.
the Fourier transform between position and momentum, look elementary);
(iii) has scientific advantages, e.g. by one of the duals being useful when the other
is not—though, as it happens, only in Example (3) is the scientific advantage a matter of
pairing weak and strong couplings (more precisely: temperatures).
4.1 (1): Newtonian mechanics with different standards of rest
Consider two formulations of Newtonian point-particle mechanics (say N particles with
gravitation), that differ in what they identify as absolute space (what inertial timelike
congruence is ‘truly at rest’).
Here the natural choice for the bare theory would be a neo-Newtonian (also called:
‘Galilean’) formulation of point-particle mechanics, which postulates a flat affine connec-
tion on spacetime, but no absolute rest. Thus the spacetime might be taken to be IR4.
Then in the bare theory, the obvious congruence of inertial timelike lines, i.e. the lines
〈t, x, y, z〉 (with t varying, and x, y, z fixed, for each line) is on a par with—no more ‘at
rest’ than—any congruence boosted with respect to it, such as 〈t, x − vt, y, z〉 (with t
varying, and x, y, z fixed, for each line; and v fixed for the whole congruence; representing
a boost in the x direction).
Then the two duals (two models, in our sense) would be formulations of point-particle
mechanics set in Newtonian spacetime. So the specific structure by which the two duals
differ lies in their specifications of absolute rest. The ‘left’ dual might specify as absolute
rest, the first-mentioned congruence, with lines 〈t, x, y, z〉; while on the other hand, the
‘right’ dual specifies 〈t, x− vt, y, z〉.
Let us fill this out a little in terms of the state-space, the map ds etc. The configuration
space of the N particles can be taken to be IR3N . (I say ‘can be taken’ because (i) one
might instead take the affine space, and (ii) one might remove the coincidence points where
two or more particle locations coincide.) Then a state can be an assignment of values
of (absolute!) position and velocity to each particle: (x1, ...zN ; x˙1, ....z˙N). We may then
define the duality map ds on states so that it takes a state (x1, ...zN ; x˙1, ....z˙N) of the first
(‘left’) model to the state in the second (‘right’) model with the same numerical values,
with respect to its (the right model’s) specification of absolute rest, as the argument-state
had for the the left model’s specification. This definition of ds, together with a definition
of dq that sends ‘absolute rest’ to ‘absolute rest’ etc. will preserve the values of absolute
quantities, i.e. would satisfy eq. 6.
Agreed: there is another, equally natural, way to define ds and dq. Namely: ds is
to take a state (x1, ...zN ; x˙1, ....z˙N) of the left model to the same state ‘as regards IR
4’
(of course, as described by the right model). Here, ‘same as regards IR4’ means that if
Mr Right’s absolute rest is boosted with respect to Ms Left’s by, say, velocity v in the x
direction, then particles that are at rest according to Ms Left, x˙1 = y˙1 = ... = z˙N ≡ 0 will
be moving at velocity −v in the x direction according to Mr Right, i.e. with primed coor-
dinates x˙′1 = x˙
′
2 = ... = x˙
′
N ≡ −v: and so ds is to fix their worldlines taken as (unprimed)
coordinate curves in IR4. (Again, the paper’s motto applies!) For brevity, I will lean on
the structure of IR4 with its distinguished coordinate lines, and say that this ds fixes the
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physical state. But however one labels (or thinks of) this ds, it still allows the duality to
preserve values, i.e. satisfy eq. 6, by our suitably defining dq to ‘compensate for the boost’.
For us, the important point is that, with either the first or the second way of defining
the duality maps ds and dq, this Example is a case of (Contr). For the duals disagree
about what is absolute rest.
On the first way of defining the duality maps, the values match, i.e. eq. 6 is satisfied,
even though dq pairs Ms Left’s and Mr Right’s intended meanings for ‘absolute rest’—and
so respects their mutual disagreement, so that the reference, or extension, of ‘absolute
rest’ is different on the two sides. Namely: The values match, eq. 6 is satisfied, because
ds is not the identity map on what I called the ‘physical states’: ds maps a state of Ms
Left to another state that gets the same numerical values for Mr Right’s corresponding
(by dq) quantities.
And on the other hand: on the second way of defining the duality maps, the values
match, i.e. eq. 6 is satisfied, even though now ds is the identity map on physical states.
Namely: The values match, eq. 6 is satisfied, because now dq is defined so as to not pair
Ms Left’s and Mr Right’s intended meanings for ‘absolute rest’—but rather, to ‘compen-
sate for the boost’.
To sum up: The ‘left’ isomorphic set of states is all the possible instantaneous states
of N particles that inhabit a Newtonian spacetime, equipped with ‘this’ absolute rest ;
and the ‘right’ isomorphic set of states is all the possible instantaneous states of N par-
ticles that inhabit a Newtonian spacetime, equipped with ‘that’ absolute rest, defined as
boosted with respect to the left, i.e. ‘this’ one. (I spoke in terms of instantaneous states;
but given the two-way determinism, I could have said ‘all the possible histories’.) And
this pair of duals, on the left and right, illustrates (Contr).9
Beware: it is tempting to say that there is no real disagreement, that the contrary
specifications of absolute rest are ‘gauge’, or ‘a distinction without a difference’, or ‘a
sign that we should move to a neo-Newtonian formulation of point-particle mechanics’, a
formulation in which the ‘surplus structure of absolute rest (i.e. specific structure in our
Schema’s jargon) is eliminated’.
I agree that it is tempting to say these things. But the point is: these temptations are
the benefit of hindsight, i.e. of our now knowing the neo-Newtonian formulation. Recall
the remarks in Section 2.3 that, as I put it, ‘Newton’s and Clarke’s views are tenable’; and
the remarks in this Section’s preamble, about a duality being non-obvious at a certain
historical epoch. Thus, interpreting the duality with ‘Newton’s and Clarke’s views’, or
returning to that earlier epoch: the duality illustrates (Contr).
Agreed: these ‘temptations’, as I have called them, hint at two other important func-
9Agreed: my discussion of spacetime, with its dubbing states ‘physical’ in terms of the structure of
IR4, is a ‘cartoon’. (Thanks to T. Barrett, G. Leegwater and O. Pooley for pointing this out.) For a
proper discussion, cf. e.g. Malament (2012, Chapter 4), Pooley (2019, Chapter 4.3, 4.4). But despite the
cartoon, the point remains that the empirical undetectability of Newton’s absolute space can be rendered
in spacetime terms as two formulations disagreeing about which timelike congruence is at rest, and thus
exemplifying (Contr).
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tions of duality. Namely, to prompt us to guess: either
(i): the bare theory, the ‘common core’, when we have no formulation of it (or only a
defective, or intractable, or unperspicuous formulation), or
(ii) another theory ‘behind the duals’, of which the two duals are—not representations
(a la the Schema) but—approximations, in two different parts of some parameter space
(different regimes or sectors).
Typically, a theory (ii) will be ‘more different’ from the duals than is the bare theory (i),
because it aims to describe more phenomena than they do: e.g. by including phenomena
at higher energies, while each of the duals describes a low energy regime. (Or replace
energy by another important scale, such as velocity or curvature.) Thus for Example (1),
with the bare theory (i) taken as a neo-Newtonian formulation, a putative theory (ii)
could be general relativity. Clearly, guessing such theories, when one only knows the two
duals, is hard!
Obviously, these two heuristic functions of a duality are scientifically very important:
and I will briefly return to them in Section 6. But for most of this paper, I can set them
aside. As does much of the philosophical literature about dualities: for it concentrates
on dualities’ connections with issues in logic and ontology, such as theoretical equivalence
(as this paper does) and symmetry, rather than issues in methodology.10
Apart from illustrating (Contr), this Example also has four noteworthy Features. We
will see them recur, or be varied, in other Examples. And Features 1) and 2) will bear on
whether an Example illustrates (Contr) or (Diff):—
1): Toy cosmology? It is natural to think of each dual (and the bare theory) as a ‘toy
cosmology’: not least because of the historical influence of point-particle world-pictures,
as advocated by such figures as Boscovitch and Laplace. That is: It is natural—or at
least, it was traditional—to take each formulation as saying that (a) there are no bodies
apart from the N particles (i.e. there is no environment of the system—which is the
cosmos!) and that (b) there are no forces apart from the given Galilean-invariant one,
such as Newtonian gravitation.
2): Complete set of states? In each dual, we have what the tradition, the textbook,
would regard as the complete set of states for the ‘toy cosmos’, that are compatible with
the specification of absolute rest that has been made.
3): The size of the duality group? In this Example, there is a whole boost group worth
of duals, i.e. IR3-worth. For any vector in IR3 can represent the velocity with which to
boost from a fiducial specification of the absolute rest. But we focus on just two duals.
(In the jargon of duality groups: we take the duality group to be Z2.)
4): More variety Of course, Newtonian point-particle mechanics, as usually under-
stood, encompasses varying N ; while we have implicitly taken a fixed value of N . But
this was just to keep matters simple. That is: the simplest strategy is to have each bare
theory (and so its models) fix N , and to express the intended generality of the original
10Exceptions include: Dawid (2013; 2017 Sections 4.2, 4.3), Rickles (2011: 66; 2013: 319; 2013a, 67-
78; 2017: 66), De Haro’s discussion of (i) and (ii) for gauge/gravity duality (2016 Section 2.1; 2016a,
Section 2.1; 2017, Section 3.2), and his general discussion of the heuristic function (2018). The latter
distinguishes (i) and (ii): De Haro calls (i) a ‘theoretical function’ (especially Section 4.1.2), and calls
only (ii) a ‘heuristic function’, and its theory a ‘successor theory’ (Sections 4.1.3 and 5).
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theory by simply universally quantifying over N . But maybe, one could formulate a more
abstract bare theory that encompasses all N .
Note also that one could write down several Examples that are ‘cousins’ of Example
(1). Thus one could write down theories other than point-particle mechanics, e.g. fluid
mechanics, with two contrary specifications of absolute rest. The natural choice for the
bare theory would again be a formulation of e.g. fluid mechanics using a neo-Newtonian
spacetime. And the two duals would be formulations set in a Newtonian spacetime, that
disagree with each other about absolute rest. These duals will again illustrate (Contr).
And broadly speaking, the discussion in Example (1) about the state space, the definition
of the duality maps, and the four noteworthy Features, will carry over, mutatis mutandis.11
Similarly, one could write down theories, of mechanics or of electromagnetism, ‘in the
spirit of Lorentz’ (i.e. before he acceded to the Einsteinian abandonment of absolute
simultaneity). Roughly speaking: in each formulation, a light cone structure is added to
IR4: and thus, applying the Einsteinian definition of simultaneity, an operational notion
of simultaneity relative to each inertial observer (timelike congruence) is added. But
the duals (models) are to contradict each other in their specification of the ‘invisible’,
‘underlying’ absolute simultaneity relation. So these duals will again illustrate (Contr).
In these ‘cousin’ Examples, one would no doubt take the bare theory to use Minkowski
geometry. And broadly speaking, the above discussion about the state space, the duality
maps, and the four noteworthy Features, will again carry over, mutatis mutandis. In
particular, as in Example (1): the temptation to say that the contrary specifications of
absolute simultaneity are ‘gauge’, or ‘a distinction without a difference’ etc., should be
set aside. For Lorentz’s views ca. 1905-1912, before he acceded to Einstein’s vision, were
entirely tenable.
4.2 (2): Position-momentum duality in elementary quantum
mechanics
I turn to the unitary equivalence, by Fourier transformation, between the position (i.e.
Schro¨dinger) representation and the momentum representation in elementary wave me-
chanics. For simplicity, we consider a single spinless non-relativistic particle in one spatial
dimension. Thus one might take the bare theory to be the Hilbert space L2(IR), equipped
with its algebra of (say: bounded) linear operators. Then the idea is: the left dual is fixed
by the choice of position, the right by the choice of momentum.
It is usual to think of these choices as just ‘choices of basis’. More precisely, so as to
11I say ‘broadly speaking’ because there will be some substantial differences. For a start, the configu-
ration space of a fluid is infinite-dimensional. So the technical details of the states, quantities and duality
maps will be much more intricate; and in Feature 4), we will be universally quantifying, not over an
integer N representing the number of particles, but over e.g. the real number ρ representing the density
of an incompressible fluid. Besides, Feature 1) falters, in that we do not normally think of a sample
of a classical fluid as the entire material content of the universe: but agreed, this may just reflect the
historical contingency that no such world-picture was as influential as its point-particle ‘rivals’ by such
figures as Boscovitch and Laplace.
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respect the fact that position and momentum are continuous quantities, and so do not
have eigenvectors: as ‘choices of a spectral family of projectors’. The unitary Fourier
transformation is then a passive transformation sending an arbitrary physical state, ex-
pressed in position representation, to the momentum representation of the same physical
state: and so preserving all quantities’ expectation values. A bit more precisely, using
an elementary wave-mechanical formalism: a wave function ψ : IR → |C is mapped to its
Fourier transform ψ˜ : IR → |C. This is of course not the identity map on functions: a
sharply peaked function is mapped to a spread-out one, and vice versa, attesting to the
uncertainty principle. But we interpret it as the identity function on physical states, since
we define a corresponding map on physical quantities (represented as linear operators) in
such a way that any quantity’s expectation value is preserved. Namely, one shows that:
(i) the Fourier transform ψ 7→ ψ˜ is a unitary map F (for ‘Fourier’) on the state-space;
so that
(ii) the usual (Schro¨dinger) representations of position and momentum as Q : ψ(x) 7→
xψ(x) and P : ψ(x) 7→ −i d
dx
ψ(x) respectively, are related by: P = F−1QF ; so that
(iii) the preservation of any expectation value between the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ amounts,
essentially, to an inner product being the same when calculated in two different orthobases,
related by a unitary map. (For details, cf.: at a pedagogic level, e.g. Jordan (1969: Section
18); or more rigorously, Prugovecki (1981: Sections 4.3, 4.5), Takhtajan (2008: 89-92).)
In terms of our notations, ds is the identity map on physical states, and dq is the
identity map on physical quantities. So of course eq. 6, thus interpreted, is satisfied. But
neither map is the identity map on states’, or quantities’, expressions as, respectively,
complex functions on IR, and linear operators on such functions. Interpreting eq. 6 in
terms of these expressions, it expresses the equality of an inner product calculated in
unitarily related orthobases.
But this usual way of thinking of the duality does not serve my present purpose, viz.
exemplifying the Remark. For it clearly does not make the left and right duals disagree,
in either of our senses (Contr) or (Diff). The two duals’ claims do agree, though they are
expressed in different languages (‘bases’).12
However, we can get an illustration of (Diff) by thinking of this duality differently.
We need ‘to think like Bohr’: that is, to take the position and momentum ‘perspec-
tives’ (‘windows’, ‘contexts’) to exclude each other. Where ‘exclude’ means—not so much
‘contradict’, as—‘cannot be adopted together’.
Thus the left dual is to be only about position. We can take its set of states to be
12Thus it needed no fancy footwork in order to satisfy eq. 6: unlike Example (1), with its two options
for defining ds and dq, that carefully made only one of the two maps the identity on physical states or
quantities (cf. the start of Section 4.1).
On the other hand: this usual way of thinking of the duality is an important prototype for other
dualities where the claims of the left and right duals agree. Example (4) will be another example from
quantum theory, where the duality map is a unitary transformation that we think of as ‘passive’ and
‘preserving all the physics’. And bosonization is another (much more advanced) quantum example, again
with a unitary equivalence. Here, a quantum field system in 1+1 dimensions can be ‘written down’
with bosonic excitations, and also written down with fermionic excitations: with the same degrees of
freedom, or subject-matter, in both formulations (2017, Sections 4,5). In this paper, Example (5) will be
an elementary classical example of duals that agree.
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just the set of probability distributions for position; so in an elementary wave-mechanical
formalism, a state is a probability density given as the squared modulus of the wave-
function: p(x) ≡ |ψ(x)|2. And the left dual’s quantities are to be just position Q (i.e.
multiplication by the argument-variable x) and the (Borel) functions of position, f(Q):
their expectation values are then, in the elementary formalism, 〈f(Q)〉 = ∫ dx f(x)p(x).
Similarly, the right dual is only about momentum. Its states are just the probability
distributions for momentum, p(k), where we write the argument variable as k to signal
the interpretation as momentum; and its quantities are just the (Borel) functions of
momentum, f(P ), with expectation values 〈f(P )〉 = ∫ dk f(k)p(k). (We can put these
choices in the slightly more abstract language of algebras of bounded operators. On the
left, we can take the algebra of quantities to be just position, together with functions
of position: more precisely, the abelian von Neumann algebra generated by position.
And similarly on the right: we can take the abelian von Neumann algebra generated by
momentum.)
We now define the duality map ds to map the state p(x) to the same mathematical
real function: but now interpreted as a probability density for momentum (so that we
again write the argument variable as k). So the mathematical duality map ds is the
identity map on probability distributions on IR: but as interpreted on physical states, it
is an active transformation—not the identity map. Similarly for quantities: each Borel
function f is mapped to itself, as a pure mathematical function, but the interpretation
changes: dq : f(Q) 7→ f(P ). (Again, in the language of bounded operators: the duality
map dq on quantities is the identity map on linear operators: but interpreted as an active
transformation, the non-identity map, on physical quantities.)
With these definitions, the ‘preservation of values’ in our Schema, eq. 6, is not a
preservation of physical, interpreted expectation values, as in the usual way of thinking
of the duality: (again, the motto is illustrated). Rather, ds and dq preserve the ‘shape’ or
‘graph’ of mathematical real functions p (a probability density), and f (a Borel function).
It is clear that this gives a case of (Diff). For the duals describe different subject-
matters: position and momentum respectively.13
It is also clear that (unlike Example (1)’s case of (Contr)) there is no temptation—even
in hindsight, when one has long been accustomed to the duality— to say that there is no
real difference between the duals, or that the contrast between position and momentum
is ‘gauge’, or ‘a distinction without a difference’, or ‘a sign that we should move to a
mechanics that eliminates the contrast’.
Let us compare this with Example (1), as regards the four noteworthy Features. For
the first three, we get the opposite verdict to that in Example (1); for the fourth, the
Examples are similar:—
13 We noted towards the end of Section 3.2 that in a quantum theory, non-commutation made the idea
of different subject-matters more subtle than the classical construal as cross-cutting partitions. But as
announced there, this subtlety does not affect this paper: and we set it aside. Indeed Feature 1), just
below, notes that the duals might be used to study different spinless quantum particles on distinct lines—
making the different subject-matters, i.e. spectral families, an utterly unproblematic case of orthogonality
in Lewis’ sense.
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1): Toy cosmology? It is not natural to think of each dual (nor the bare theory) as a
toy cosmology. There might well be an environment to the system. In particular, there
could be another replica system, another spinless non-relativistic quantum particle con-
fined to another (non-intersecting) spatial line. And we could study our original given
system via its position probability distributions, and the replica system via its momentum
distributions. If so, the two duals would ‘describe different subject-matters’ in two senses
of that phrase: both different quantities, and different systems. Cf. footnote 13.
2): Complete set of states? In each dual, we do not have what the tradition, the text-
book, would regard as the complete set of states for the system. There is only position
information on the left, and only the momentum information on the right. On each side
the ‘other information’, contained in the phase of the wave-function, has been erased by
taking the modulus squared. (Agreed: we do have, on the left, all the probability distri-
butions on the real line. So we have on the left all possible ‘states’ in a relative sense, i.e.
relative to the specification we have made of which quantity. Similarly on the right. Thus
relativized, this is like Example (1).)
3): The size of the duality group? Given the left dual, defined as say the spectral
family for position, and the idea of a unitary transformation from it to a right dual, there
is a vastly richer set of definable right duals than just the IR3-worth we saw in Example
(1) (corresponding to the various possible boost velocities v ∈ IR3). After all, the unitary
transformations on L2(IR) are an infinite-dimensional set. (Agreed, there are various ways
to drastically cut down the number of duals: by strengthening the definition of a dual
from ‘a spectral family with IR as spectrum’ to, e.g., the abelian von Neumann algebra
such a family generates; and by constraining the unitary transformation considered.)
4) More variety: Again, the idea of the duality encompasses a generality I have not
yet mentioned. The quantum particle that is the system can be in two or three spatial di-
mensions, instead of one; and there can be 1, or 2, or .... N particles. Again, the simplest
strategy is to keep the bare theory reasonably concrete (hence our choice of L2(IR)), and
to express the intended generality by simply universally quantifying, i.e. having many
close-cousin dualities.
4.3 (3): Kramers-Wannier duality in classical statistical me-
chanics
It is interesting to note that this famous duality is conceptually similar to Example (2):
at least, ‘conceptually similar’ if we adopt the broad-brush, or bird’s-eye, perspective
of a philosopher! Though this duality is unfamiliar to philosophers, it is worth briefly
sketching: both for this reason and because—like Examples (1) and (2)—it will help
substantiate the Remark. (I will follow Thompson (1972: Section 6-2). For more details,
including many generalizations, cf. e.g. Savit (1980), Lavis and Bell (1999).)
We can take the bare theory to be the classical equilibrium statistical mechanics of a
two-dimensional square lattice with the Ising Hamiltonian: more specifically, the canon-
ical ensemble with the Boltzmann probabilistic weights for a configuration s given by
exp(−βH[s]), where H is the Ising Hamiltonian and β ≡ 1/kT is the inverse temperature.
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We take the duals, i.e. the models of the bare theory, to be approximations (viz. expan-
sions involving a sum of exponentials) to the partition function Z ≡ Σs exp(−βH[s]) that
are valid at low and high temperatures T , respectively: say, low on the ‘left’ and high on
the ‘right’.
So in this Example, ‘model’ does not mean ‘representation’ in the sense of representa-
tion theory, as it usually does for our Schema. Here instead, our use of ‘model’ sits happily
with the word’s usual connotation that a model is an approximation; (so the warning (ii),
at the start of Section 2, can be ignored here—though not in any of this paper’s other
Examples). But to give a more precise definition of the duals, i.e. the models, it will be
clearest to first sketch the idea of the duality.
It turns out that, since a square lattice is self-dual in a certain geometric sense,14
the low and high temperature expansions are very simply related. If we write the par-
tition function in terms of the dimensionless inverse temperature ν := J/kT , where J is
the nearest-neighbour coupling in the Hamiltonian, then the low temperature (large ν)
expansion Z(ν) obeys (with N the number of lattice sites)
Z(ν) = Z(tanh−1(exp(−2ν)))21−N(2 sinh 2ν)N . (9)
Now we define ν∗ by tanh ν∗ := exp(−2ν), so that ν∗ = 0/∞ iff ν = ∞/0 respectively.
So low temperature i.e. large ν corresponds to a high conjugate temperature i.e. small
ν∗. Then we can write:
Z(ν) = Z(ν∗)21−N(2 sinh 2ν)N . (10)
relating the expansions for low and high temperatures.
Historically, the original scientific importance of this duality lies in its implication that
singularities of the partition function, representing phase transitions, must occur in pairs.
For this implies that if there is only one singularity, it must occur at a critical tempera-
ture given by ν∗ = ν, i.e. when tanh ν = exp(−2ν) i.e. sinh 2ν = 1 or νc := 12 sinh−1(1).
In other words, the critical temperature Tc ≡ J/kνc = 2J/k sinh−1(1). By this kind of
reasoning, Kramers and Wannier deduced in 1941 that the 2-dimensional Ising model has
a phase transition, and the value of the critical temperature: three years before Onsager,
in 1944, solved the model exactly.15
So much by way of sketching the duality. To put it in terms of our Schema: as we
said, we take the bare theory to be the exact canonical ensemble of the lattice at all
temperatures: more precisely, the family (parameterized by varying T ) of all the exact
partition functions. So we here set aside the microscopic configurations (s in exp(−βH[s])
above), and take a state in our Schema (s in Section 2’s notation) to be a partition function
Z(T ), with the values of quantities such as free energy extracted by taking logarithms,
differentiation etc. in the usual way. The two duals are then the approximations, i.e. the
14That word again! But I need not define it: it is a matter of the lattice being mapped to (as isomorphic
copy of) itself under, being a fixed point of, a certain geometric construction.
15For my rationale in saying ‘kind of reasoning’, and more references about how the duality between
high and low temperature regimes can be generalized to other models, cf. (briefly) Thompson (1972: 117,
154); and for details, Savit (1980), Lavis and Bell (1999: Sections 8.2-8.3, 206-211). For the history of
the Ising model, cf. Brush (1967).
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expansions, valid at low and high temperatures. We do not need their exact form. We
only need to note that: taking the left dual as the family of expansions parameterized by T
being in some low range [T1, T2] ⊂ IR, i.e. by large ν := J/kT in the range [J/kT2, J/kT1],
corresponds to the right dual being the expansions parameterized by small ν∗ in the
range [tanh(exp(J/kT1)), tanh(exp(J/kT2))]. Then: eq. 10 implies that the duality map
on states ds is defined by
ds : Z(ν) 7→ Z(ν∗) := Z(ν)
21−N(2 sinh 2ν)N
. (11)
It is clear that this is similar to Example (2) in several ways. For us, the main point
is that it illustrates the Remark, by being a case of (Diff). The left dual is about the
low temperature regime, the right dual about the high temperature regime—different
though isomorphic subject-matters. This is similar to Example (2)’s left dual, the posi-
tion description (‘perspective’,‘window’) being isomorphic to the momentum description.
Indeed, it illustrates (Diff)’s idea of cross-cutting partitions more simply than Example
(2) did, since it is unclouded by quantum theory’s non-commutation of quantities: cf.
footnote 13, and Feature 1) below.
And as in Example (2): there is no temptation—even in hindsight, when one has long
been accustomed to the duality—to say that there is no real difference between the duals,
or that the contrast between low and high temperature is ‘gauge’, or ‘a distinction without
a difference’, or ‘a sign that we should move to a statistical mechanics that eliminates the
contrast’.
The noteworthy Features yield further similarities. In short: The first two Features are
similar to Example (2); the third Feature is more like Example (1) (but more ‘extreme’);
and the fourth Feature matches both Example (1) and Example (2) (which agreed with
each other). In detail:—
1): Toy cosmology? It is not natural to think of each dual (nor the bare theory) as a toy
cosmology. Of course, there might well be an environment to the system. In particular,
there could be another replica system, another Ising lattice. And we could study our
original given system at low temperature, and the replica system at high temperature. If
so, the two duals would ‘describe different subject-matters’ in two senses: both different
temperature ranges, and different systems. And thanks to considering different systems,
this gives another case of subject-matters that are orthogonal in Lewis’ sense. In terms
of partitions and worlds: a cell for the left dual describing a lattice at a low temperature
T intersects all cells for the right dual describing a lattice at a high temperature—since
worlds in these intersections contain two lattices, one at the low temperature T and the
other at some high temperature—which temperature depending on which cell of the right
dual we consider.
2): Complete set of states? In each dual, we do not have what the tradition, the
textbook, would regard as the complete set of states for the system. For first, the duals
are approximations; and second, there is only low temperature information on the left,
and only high temperature information on the right. (Besides, as noted above: since this
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is thermal physics, we have in each dual set aside the microscopic conception of state, i.e.
all the microscopic configurations of the lattice.)
3): The size of the duality group? On our definitions, the left dual state at inverse
temperature ν ≡ J/kT has a unique right dual at inverse temperature ν∗. (The real-
parameter family of states is the dual ‘as a whole’.) So far as I know, there is no ‘knob’
in each dual’s specific structure, analogous to Example (1)’s choice of absolute rest or
Example (2)’s choice of unitary transformation, that can be ‘twiddled’ to yield, for a
given left dual, a whole family of right duals, analogous to Example (1)’s IR3-worth of
boosted duals.
4): More variety: Again, there is a generality I have not yet mentioned: though it is
more complex and varied than just changing the value of a parameter or two, such as N ,
the number of lattice-sites (or the number of particles in Examples (1) and (2)), and J
the coupling. For it turns out that the duality generalizes, and not just to Ising models
in other dimensions, but to many other models: both to statistical systems and to field
theories, pairing weak and strong couplings. Savit (1980) is a thorough review.
4.4 (4): The unitary equivalence between Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger
pictures in quantum mechanics
This Example is like Example (2), in two ways. It returns us to elementary quantum
mechanics. And, like the usual way of thinking of the Fourier transform between position
and momentum, the duality map is a unitary transformation that we think of as a ‘passive’
transformation that ‘preserves all the physics’.
This second point means that it does not serve our present purpose, viz. exemplifying
the Remark: since the left and right duals do not disagree, in either of our senses (Contr)
or (Diff). So I will treat it only briefly.16
To make this Example neat, one has to suppress Section 2.2’s requirement that a dual-
ity should respect the dynamics (whether in Heisenberg or Schro¨dinger picture). Besides,
the one-parameter group of unitary operators that carries one between the pictures de-
pends on the system, i.e. the Hamiltonian, concerned. So to make the Example neat, it
is best to make the bare theory so specific as to choose a Hamiltonian. Then the simplest
tactic is to define the bare theory to consist simply of all appropriate (e.g. continuous)
temporal sequences of assignments of values to all desired quantities—which are then
represented in Hilbert spaces by the Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger pictures (duals).
I will not linger to put all this in notation, but will just turn to the noteworthy
Features.
In short: The first Feature is similar to Examples (2) and (3), and unlike (1); the
second Feature is the other way round—similar to Example (1) and unlike Examples (2)
and (3); the third Feature is like Examples (1) and (2); and the fourth Feature matches
16The main merits of including it are that: (i) on reading the Schema, it naturally comes to mind as
a putative example; and (ii) it is unlike the previous Examples in being all about dynamics: which has
been downplayed hitherto (as I announced), and which was wholly absent from the equilibrium theory
of Example (3).
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all three previous Examples (which agreed with each other). In detail:—
1): Toy cosmology? It is not natural to think of each dual (nor the bare theory) as a
toy cosmology. In general, there are of course other systems, and some of these might be
replicas of the given one (with the given Hamiltonian).
2): Complete set of states? In each dual, we have what we would regard as the com-
plete set of states for the system.
3): The size of the duality group? There is a ‘plenitude of duals’. As we learn from text-
book discussions of the interaction picture, one can ‘divide the labour’ of time-evolution
between states and quantities in different ways, additional to the ‘only states’ and ‘only
quantities’ of the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures. In principle, each expression of
the Hamiltonian as a sum defines such a ‘division of labour’.
4): More variety: Again, there is a generality I have not yet mentioned: though it is
more complex and varied than just changing the value of a parameter or two. Namely:
the duality encompasses varying Hamiltonians. So here is an analogy with previous Ex-
amples, especially (3). And again, the simplest tactic to express the intended generality
is to just universally quantify over Hamiltonians.
4.5 (5): The Legendre transformation between Lagrangian and
Hamiltonian classical mechanics
My last elementary Example is the Legendre transformation between Lagrangian and
Hamiltonian classical mechanics. For my purposes, it is in broad terms like Example (4).
For (i): on reading the Schema, it naturally comes to mind as a putative example; (ii)
unlike Examples (1)-(3), it is about dynamics; and (iii) most important for us: it does not
serve our present purpose, viz. exemplifying the Remark: since the left and right duals
do not disagree, in either of our senses (Contr) or (Diff).
Agreed: a Lagrangian and a Hamiltonian description of, say, N point-particles, or of
a spinning top, differ in some of their advantages and disadvantages, both formal and
interpretative. (My own effort to articulate some of these advantages and disadvantages
is Butterfield (2004, 2006).) But surely, no one would say that the descriptions contradict
each other, a la (Contr), or that they have different subject-matters a la (Diff). So like
Example (4), I will treat it only very briefly, just sketching the idea.
Let us for simplicity confine ourselves to finite-dimensional systems: and also fix the
configuration space Q once and for all. Then the state-space for the Lagrangian dual
(model, in our sense) is the tangent bundle TQ, and the state-space of the Hamilto-
nian dual (model) is the cotangent bundle T ∗Q. The idea is that the duality map ds
on states should be the Legendre transformation (which is also called: ‘fibre derivative’).
It should map the Lagrangian ‘physical state’ (q, q˙) ∈ TQ to the Hamiltonian ‘physical
state’ (q, p) ∈ T ∗Q. For this to be work as neatly as possible, various conditions must be
satisfied. The two main ones are:
(a) Since we must have p = ∂L/∂q˙, we also require that the Lagrangian dual be
equipped with the Lagrangian L, as a scalar function on TQ: L : TQ→ IR; and that the
Hamiltonian dual be equipped with the Hamiltonian H as a scalar: H : T ∗Q → IR. (So
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this implies a time-independent dynamics on both sides.) There is then enough structure
in the left Lagrangian dual for the map ds to be defined; and similarly for the inverse map
d−1s .
(b) L must be such that the Legendre transformation ds : (TQ,L) → (T ∗Q,H)
is a diffeomorphism: its inverse is then d−1s : (T
∗Q,H) → (TQ,L). This is called the
Lagrangian and Hamiltonian being hyperregular.
There is a wealth of deep and beautiful theory hereabouts. But it is not for this paper.17
I turn to the noteworthy Features.
In short: the Features are like Example (4)—perhaps unsurprisingly, since both Ex-
amples are about two ‘total frameworks’ for describing dynamics. Thus the first Feature
is similar to Examples (2) (3) and (4), and unlike (1); the second Feature is similar to
Examples (1) and (4) and unlike Examples (2) and (3); the third Feature is like Examples
(1), (2) and (4); and the fourth Feature matches all four previous Examples (which agreed
with each other). In detail:—
1): Toy cosmology? It is not natural to think of each dual, which uses a fixed finite-
dimensional configuration space Q, as a toy cosmology. In general, there are countless
other systems; and some of these might be replicas of the given one (with the given
Lagrangian/Hamiltonian). Agreed: This contrast with Example (1) reflects history and
habit, as I mentioned under Feature 1) in Section 4.1.
2): Complete set of states? In each dual, we have what we would regard as the com-
plete set of states for the system.
3): The size of the duality group? There is a ‘plenitude of duals’. As we learn from
textbook discussions of Routhians (e.g. Goldstein et al. 2002: 348), we can ‘pick and
choose’ about how to treat the time derivatives of the configurational variables q1, ..., qN .
That is: we can adopt a mixed Routhian formalism using velocities for the first M vari-
ables q˙1, ..., q˙M and canonical momenta for the remainder pM+1, ..., pN .
4): More variety: Again, there is a generality I have not yet mentioned: and again, it
is more complex and varied than just changing the value of a parameter or two. And this
is so, even if we set aside the adaptation of the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian frameworks,
beyond finite-dimensional mechanics, in e.g. continuum mechanics and electromagnetism.
Namely: within finite-dimensional mechanics, there is the great variety of configuration
manifolds Q; and for a fixed Q, all the various Lagrangian/Hamiltonian scalar fields on
the tangent bundle/cotangent bundle. So here is an analogy with previous Examples,
especially (3) and (4). And again, the simplest tactic to express the intended generality
is to just universally quantify over manifolds and Hamiltonians.
To sum up this Section: With five examples, we have illustrated the Schema for
duality, and established my main Remark. Namely: duals can disagree with each other,
either by:
(Contr): making contrary assertions about a common subject-matter, such as the
17A classic exposition is Abraham and Marsden (1978: especially theorems 3.6.2, 3.6.8, 3.6.9). Recent
uses of this Example in connection in philosophical discussions about how best to define theoretical
equivalence include Barrett (2015, 2017), Teh and Tzementzis (2017).
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standard of absolute rest: as in Example (1); or by :
(Diff): making claims about distinct but suitably ‘isomorphic’ subject-matters:
such as the continuous quantities, position and momentum, in elementary quantum me-
chanics (Example (2)); or (approximations to) the low and high temperature regimes of
an Ising model (Example (3)).
So as announced in Section 1.1, my tasks now are:
(i) to spell out the Implication of this Remark for proposed definitions, in logic
and philosophy, of theories being ‘equivalent’ (Section 5);
(ii) to argue that some string-theoretic dualities also illustrate the Remark (Section
6).
5 An Implication about theoretical equivalence
The Remark has a simple implication—I shall say ‘Implication’—for accounts of theo-
retical equivalence. Namely: two dual theories satisfying (Contr) or (Diff) might get
formalized so as to be logically equivalent—where I use ‘formalized’ and ‘logically equiva-
lent’ with their standard meanings, in logic and philosophy. But obviously such duals are
not equivalent—as ‘equivalent’ is normally understood. So such cases show that logical
equivalence is too weak an explication of theoretical equivalence. And so also, therefore,
is any weakening of logical equivalence.
As I explained at the end of Section 1.1, this Implication, though simple, is worth
stressing. For the recent philosophical literature on theoretical equivalence has focussed
on various weakenings of logical equivalence: a focus motivated by logical equivalence
being clearly, in one regard, too strong. So it is worth seeing that—notwithstanding
the literature’s rationale for weakening logical equivalence—there is also a problem ‘in
the other direction’. That is: a defect of being too weak, rather than too strong (as an
explication of theoretical equivalence).
I will fill out this Implication in three Subsections. The first is a warning about jargon,
especially ‘theoretical equivalence’ and ‘physical equivalence’ (Section 5.1: which returns
us to Section 3.1’s advertisement for intensional semantics). The second spells out the
Implication for logical equivalence (Section 5.2). The third shows that the Implication
also holds for notions weaker than logical equivalence, which have been proposed in the
literature (Section 5.3).
5.1 A warning about jargon
We saw at the end of Section 1.1 that ‘theoretical equivalence’ is a term of art. While all
agree that we need some notion of ‘making the same claims about the world’, there is no
agreed definition. (This is like ‘proposition’ in the philosophy of logic and language: all
agree we need some notion of ‘meaning of a sentence’, but the exact definition varies or
is lacking.) We also saw that logical equivalence, as a candidate definition, is both:
(i): too strong, because of cases of synonymy (like ‘electric’ and ‘e´lectrique’): prompt-
ing the effort to give a weaker definition; and
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(ii): too weak, because of cases of homonymy (like ‘bank’ in finance and beside a river):
i.e. cases where logical equivalents disagree in their claims about the world—which will
be illustrated by my Remark’s Implication.
Agreed, you might want to reserve the phrase ‘theoretical equivalence’ for some weak-
ening of the familiar logical equivalence. For the effort mentioned in (i) finds several
salient notions, and there are too few good but distinctive words for them. Or you might
want, regardless of the hunt for the best weakening of logical equivalence, to reserve ‘the-
oretical equivalence’ for some formal notion that sets aside issues of interpretation, simply
because the adjective ‘theoretical’ connotes a contrast with ‘interpretation’. So, agreed:
if you do this, the pairs of theories the Remark draws attention to, may well get classified
as theoretically equivalent. (‘May well’ because it will depend on your exact definition of
‘theoretical equivalence’.) But of course, the implication of the Remark remains. Namely,
expressed without the jargon of ‘theoretical equivalence’: as interpreted, two such dual
theories do not make the very same claims about the world.
And to reflect the Remark, it will of course be natural (to avoid confusion) to introduce
another phrase for ‘making the very same claims about the world’. As mentioned in
Section 1.2, De Haro (2016, Section 1.2; 2016a, Section 1.2) suggests physical equivalence:
a phrase adopted by our (2017: Sections 1.1, 3.2.3(1), and also by others, e.g. Huggett
(2017: especially 85-86).
Fair enough, but beware: this phrase can also be misleading. For in philosophy, we
often distinguish the vast plethora of all (logically and-or metaphysically) possible worlds,
W , from its subset, the set N of all the nomically possible worlds: the worlds that obey
the actual laws of nature. (At least: we right-thinking Humeans, believing that the laws
of nature are contingent, do so.) And the nomically possible worlds are often called the
‘physically possible’ worlds, in a nod to the success of physics in formulating our best
guesses about the laws of nature. Thus, with this jargon in mind, one naturally hears
‘physical equivalence’ as meaning ‘equivalence across all the physically possible worlds’,
i.e. across N : which, since N ⊂ W , will be a weaker relation than ‘equivalence across all
the possible worlds’, i.e. across W . This means that the label ‘physical equivalence’, for
our notion of ‘making the very same claims about the world’, can be misleading, since my
point—the Implication—is that some pairs of theories, when interpreted, make different
claims and yet are logically equivalent.
And finally: another confusing feature of the various jargons is that the logic books’
‘logical equivalence’ is not really the same as ‘equivalence, i.e. sameness of truth-value,
across all the worlds’: even when we take W as the set of all logically possible worlds,
so that we naturally hear ‘logical equivalence’ as equivalence across all of W . For again:
the logic books’ ‘logical equivalence’ is formal—tied to a vocabulary, and disregarding
any intended meanings—and so will rule e.g. ‘The weather is fine’ and ‘Il fait beau’ as
inequivalent.
This last point returns us, of course, to Section 3.1’s advertisement for intensional
semantics. That is a framework for analysing meaning etc. that respects intended mean-
ings: and according to which, ‘same meaning’, i.e. our desired notion of ‘making the same
claim about the world’, indeed corresponds to ‘equivalence across all the worlds’. More
power to its elbow ...
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5.2 The Implication: for logical equivalence
The Remark—dual theories can disagree with each other—implies a limitation of stan-
dard approaches for formalising physical theories; (indeed, as we shall see: theories about
any topic). For two such disagreeing dual theories might get formalized so as to be equiv-
alent ‘within the meaning of the act’, i.e. equivalent according to the approach’s precise
definition of ‘equivalence’. Or to put it more charitably, since ‘theoretical equivalence’ is,
after all, a term of art (Section 5.1): the Remark implies that these approaches’ use of
‘theoretical equivalence’ has a misleading connotation.
This Implication follows because the duality implies that for this mishap, this mis-
leading formal equivalence, to occur, the only thing needed is appropriate homonymies.
That is: the same word being used in the two theories, but with mutually ‘inverted’
meanings—meanings that of course formalization sets aside.
Recall Section 2.1’s warning about the physics jargon ‘dictionary’: so now the dic-
tionary will pair the same word with mutually inverted meanings, rather than different
words with the same meaning, as ‘dictionary’ usually connotes. (But not all the words
used in the theories need to have their meanings ‘inverted’ by the dictionary: just an
appropriately chosen subset.)
I shall first explain this Implication, for the most well-known approach to defining
‘theoretical equivalence’: namely, logic books’ notion of logical equivalence. The next
Subsection explains how the Implication applies to other approaches.
Thus the logic books take theories as sets of sentences (closed under logical deduction);
and then define theories as logically equivalent if they are stated in the same language (i.e.
have the same non-logical vocabulary: also known as ‘signature’), and are made true by
the same interpretations, i.e. have the same set of models (in the sense of ‘model’ used
by logic and semantics, rather than our sense in Section 2.1!) Cf. e.g. Hodges (1997:
37-38). So for this approach, the Implication is that two dual theories that disagree with
one another (in sense (Contr) or (Diff)) may well get formalized so as to be logically
equivalent, because their different claims about the world are ‘isomorphic claims’.
We can make vivid this Implication, this mishap, in terms of the proverbial Alice
on the left, i.e. advocating the left dual, and Bob on the right, advocating the right
dual. If Alice and Bob are ‘unwise enough’ to use the same language in their advocacy
of their doctrines—in the syntactic sense of ‘language’—and an appropriate subset of the
words they both use have appropriately ‘inverted’ meanings, then: what they say, in
the syntactic sense, i.e. the words they utter, could be the same, despite their theories
disagreeing. In which case their theories might well get formalized, i.e. regimented in to
a formal language, so as to render the resulting formal theories logically equivalent.
Thus take Example (3), Kramers-Wannier duality (Section 4.3). Suppose Alice speaks
standard English, so that in advocating the left dual, i.e. the expansion for the Ising lat-
tice at low temperatures, she says ‘low temperature expansion’ etc. And suppose the
semantics (intended interpretation) of Bob’s language is ‘high-low’ inverted with respect
to Alice’s, i.e. with respect to standard English. So Bob, in advocating the right dual,
i.e. the expansion for the Ising lattice at high temperatures, and describing such a lattice
at high temperature—i.e. what we (and Alice!), speaking standard English, call ‘high
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temperature’—says ‘low temperature expansion’ etc. (Not all Bob’s words need to have
meanings ‘inverted’ with respect to Alice’s: apart from the ‘high-low’ inversion, he can
speak standard English, e.g. saying ‘lattice’ to mean lattice.) Then, thanks to the du-
ality, Alice and Bob in advocating their different theories, may say the very same set of
sentences. So the theories might get formalized so as to be rendered logically equivalent.
Exactly corresponding comments apply, of course, to the Examples of absolute rest
((Contr): Section 4.1), and position-momentum duality ((Diff): Section 4.2). Thus for
the latter, we can suppose Alice speaks standard English, so that in advocating the left
dual, her word ‘position’ means position; while Bob uses the word ‘position’ to mean
momentum—with the result that they say the very same set of sentences. So their two
doctrines might get formalized so as to be rendered logically equivalent.
We can also state the Implication in terms of the duality maps ds etc: and thereby
illustrate our motto about how confusing language can be! Thus in Example (1), on the
first definition of the duality maps: suppose Alice describes a state s by saying ‘the Nth
particle is at rest’. Then Bob describes the transformed state ds(s) (i.e. boosted relative
to Alice by the same amount as is his standard of rest) by saying the same words. But
they contradict one another: (Contr).
In Example (2), Alice describes a state s by saying ‘the particle has a Gaussian dis-
tribution for position centred at x = 5’. Bob describes the transformed state ds(s) (i.e.
the same probability distribution but for momentum instead) by saying the same words.
Their assertions differ, but are compatible: (Diff). For ‘position’ in Bob’s mouth means
momentum (in Alice’s mouth, and ours). And Bob could be referring to a different par-
ticle.
In Example (3), Alice describes a state Z(ν), i.e. an expansion of the partition function
at low temperature, by saying the lattice has a free energy F = F (Z(ν)) for a temperature
T = T (ν). Bob describes the transformed state ds(Z(ν)) := Z(ν
∗) (cf. eq. 11), i.e. the
expansion at the conjugate high temperature, by saying the same words. Their assertions
differ, but are compatible: (Diff). For ‘low’ in Bob’s mouth means high (in Alice’s mouth,
and ours). More exactly: the notation (‘numeral’) ν in Bob’s mouth means the real
number ν∗ := ν∗(ν) := tanh−1(exp(−2ν)). Similarly for the notation T and T ∗. And Bob
could be referring to a different lattice.
So much by way of explaining the Implication, as applied to the notion of logical
equivalence. There are three comments, (A) to (C), to make.
(A): Permutation arguments: Mention of homonymy, and especially of appropriately
‘inverted’ meanings, is bound to remind philosophers of other permutation arguments,
such as the inverted spectrum in the philosophy of perception (e.g. Shoemaker 1982),
Putnam’s argument for the indeterminacy of reference (1981: Chapter 2, Appendix; Lewis
(1983a); Button and Walsh (2018: Chapter 2)), and Einstein’s hole argument (connected
to Putnam’s argument by Rynasiewicz 1994). A rich field for comparison with this pa-
per’s project—but one for which I have no space.
(B): The labour of formalization: My saying ‘might well get formalized’ is shorthand
for some substantial labour. For by the standards of logic, physical theories are almost
always presented very informally. Even formulations that by the standards of theoretical
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physics are rigorous are a far cry from what a logician would call a formal theory. This
applies, not just to famous expositions of overarching general theories (e.g. of mechanics
by Abraham and Marsden (1978), and of general relativity by Hawking and Ellis (1973)),
but to expositions of the simpler, because more specific, dual theories that were Section
4’s Examples. Even the multi-variable calculus of Newtonian point-particle mechanics
(Examples (1), (5)), let alone the functional analysis needed for rigorous quantum theory
and statistical mechanics (Examples (2) to (4)), are difficult to capture adequately and
perspicuously in formal languages, especially with a first-order logic. (At the end of
Section 5.3, we will see that this trouble is one motivation for recent proposals about
theoretical equivalence.)
Nor is it just a matter of difficulty; or of physicists’ and logicians’ different habits
or interests as regards rigour. There are matters of principle. For as we learn in logic,
continuity is a second-order notion. That is (roughly speaking): to express the difference
between the reals and the rationals—whether every bounded set has a least upper bound—
you need second-order quantification: which brings with it the incompleteness (lack of a
complete proof procedure) for second-order logic. (The usual response is to stay in first-
order languages, and adopt, following Tarski, a first-order axiom scheme for continuity:
e.g. Goldblatt (2004, 61f.), Andreka et al. (2012: 643 and references cited there).)
So my saying ‘might well get formalized’ is programmatic. But notice that the labour
and obstacles just summarised have nothing to do with dualities. So it remains very
plausible that two duals could get formalized so as to be logically equivalent: thanks to
the isomorphism of model triples and the easy correspondence between the ‘knobs’ (e.g.
specifications of absolute rest, or of a range of tempertaure) that yield (Contr) and (Diff).
(C): The limits of formalism: Agreed: in order for the mishap to occur—for the
disagreeing duals to get formalized as logically equivalent—Alice and Bob have to be
‘unwise enough’ to use the same words in their advocacy of their doctrines. And the
person, Charlie say, doing the formalizing has to be ‘unwise enough’ to disregard Alice’s
and Bob’s different intended meanings of their common word(s).
Thus the Implication turns on the platitude that formal methods in logic and model
theory pay no heed to the intended interpretations of words. They only ‘discern structure’
by focussing on the mathematical consequences of assigning arbitrary references to words
(more precisely: non-logical vocabulary). Thus as I have admitted: the Remark and
Implication are unsurprising. For afficionados of the literature on theoretical equivalence,
they may be old hat. But I think they are still worth stressing, just because the literature
seems not to say them loud and clear.
5.3 The Implication: for weaker notions of equivalence
Logical equivalence is of course just one notion of equivalence between theories. This
prompts the question: how does the Implication fare with other notions? In this Section, I
will argue that since the other proposed notions of ‘theoretical equivalence’ are weakenings
of logical equivalence, the Implication again holds good.
I begin by recalling that the logical tradition of taking a theory as a set of sentences,
which leads to defining logical equivalence as above, has been rejected by many philoso-
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phers of science. They advocate instead a ‘semantic conception’ of theories, saying that
a theory is a set of models: though authors differ about what they mean by ‘model’, and
what are the merits of the semantic conception. Obviously, space prevents a full discus-
sion of this conception; and even of how the Implication fares with it. I will make just
four comments about the Remark and Implication. It is the fourth that leads to proposed
weakenings of logical equivalence, and so is the most important of the four.
(1): Better off?: Prima facie, the semantic conception seems able to accommo-
date the Remark’s cases of (Contr) and (Diff). For it promises to classify two such duals
as being ‘different theories’, simply because Section 2.2 had different model triples on the
two sides. So this suggests that this conception faces no ‘embarrassing Implication’ from
the Remark’s cases of (Contr) and (Diff).
(2): Not so fast!: On the other hand, our Schema allows dualities whose duals
do not disagree. Consider, in quantum theory, position-momentum duality at the start
of Section 4.2, the Heisenberg/Schro¨dinger pictures of time evolution (Section 4.4) and
bosonization; and in classical physics, the Legendre transformation (Section 4.5). And
more generally: the semantic conception will individuate theories far too finely if it de-
clares two theories different whenever there are different models (or classes of models).
For whatever exactly one means by ‘model’, a model will have ‘specific structure’ (cf.
Section 2.2) that may not contribute to its representational role. So overall, the semantic
conception will have some work to do to account for dualities—at least according to our
Schema.18
(3): A false contrast?: The point in (2), about the danger of individuating the-
ories far too finely, recalls more general difficulties facing the semantic conception: some
of which erode the distinction between it and the syntactic conception of theories which
was its target. In brief, this goes as follows. (Cf. Halvorson and Tsementzis (2015) and
Lutz (2017) for recent detailed critiques of the contrast between syntactic and semantic
conceptions.) In order for the semantic conception to describe models’ representational
role, and free itself from ‘specific structure’, it is drawn into associating words with the
representational parts of models. But for model theory (in logic’s sense!), and thus also for
the syntactic conception, a model is tied to a specific non-logical vocabulary (predicates
etc.) that gets assigned referents in the model’s domain. As van Fraassen (1989: 366) put
it: ‘models are defined, as in many standard logic texts, to be partially linguistic entities,
each yoked to a particular syntax’. So given any class of such models all tied to the same
vocabulary, there is a well-defined set of sentences true in each model: which model theory
calls the ‘theory’ of the class. Agreed, this theory need not be an axiomatisable, or cast
in a first-order language: but the syntactic conception was never committed to theories
having either of those features.
(4): Weakening logical equivalence: As I have announced: the literature on the-
oretical equivalence (whether adopting the syntactic conception or the semantic one) has
focussed on a limitation of defining ‘theoretical equivalence’ as logical equivalence that
18 Halvorson (2012: Section 4.2, 193-197) argues in general, without regard to dualities, that the
semantic conception will individuate theories far too finely if they are identified with a set of models. But
van Fraassen (2014: 278-281) replies that the semantic conception never endorsed so fine an individuation
of theories. Cf. footnote 2.
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goes in the opposite direction than does our Remark. That is: there are pairs of theories
that:
(a) we intuitively think of as the same, but that:
(b) are not logically equivalent, in the above sense.
Informal mathematics gives many simple examples that are more precise than my men-
tion of electromagnetism in English andin French. Examples: (i) the theory of Boolean
algebras vs. the theory of Boolean rings; (ii) the usual axioms for a group as a binary
operation, obeying certain conditions, on a set of elements, vs. the specification of a
one-object category, whose arrows are then the group elements; (iii) topology as axioms
governing a notion of ‘open set’, vs. as axioms governing ‘closed set’, vs. as axioms gov-
erning ‘closure operation’. Such pairs of theories show logical equivalence is too strong as
a criterion, or explication, of ‘theoretical equivalence’.
Of course, this limitation has long been recognized by logicians and philosophers,
including advocates of the syntactic conception. And so began the hunt for a logically
weaker explication. For this hunt, early and recent references in logic are de Bouvere
(1965), Visser (2006) and Andreka and Nemeti (2014); and recent references in philosophy
are Barrett and Halvorson (2016, 2016a, 2017), Button and Walsh (2018: Chapter 5),
Hudetz (2016, 2017, 2018) and Weatherall (2015, 2016).
But this is not the place to review the ideas and results of this literature. I will just
sketch one main idea, called definitional equivalence (also called ‘synonymy’, as in my own
jargon), and then emphasise that it makes no difference to the Remark and Implication.
That is: dual theories that satisfy (Contr) or (Diff), as in the Remark, might well get for-
malized so as to be definitionally equivalent. It will then be clear that two other proposed
weakenings of logical equivalence also make no difference to the Remark and Implication.
The idea of definitional equivalence is that starting from one presentation of a theory—
say, Boolean algebras in terms of ‘meet’ and ‘join’ in a lattice—one can introduce def-
initions of the other presentation’s notions (e.g. operations yielding a ring) and then
rigorously deduce all the claims, i.e. theorems, of the other presentation; and vice versa,
starting with the other presentation. Such deductions are almost always conducted in the
informal mathematical natural language of a textbook. But there is a strong consensus
in mathematics about which proofs are rigorous enough that they could be made wholly
rigorous e.g. by being transcribed into a predicate calculus formulation of a standard set
theory such as ZFC.19
Accordingly, definitional equivalence is made precise by mathematical logic (with its
deliberately setting aside knowledge of intended meanings!) by taking the two presen-
tations as formal theories, i.e. as sets of sentences in a formal language, closed under
deduction: call them T1 and T2. To avoid trouble from ambiguous vocabulary items, e.g.
the same predicate occurring in both languages, one assumes that the vocabularies of T1
and T2 are disjoint. Then T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent iff: (i) one can add to T1
19This consensus is, of course, the legacy—the achievement!—of the fifty years of effort, from the
Dedekind-Weierstrass arithmetization of analysis and Frege’s invention of predicate logic, to about 1930:
namely, to show that all known pure mathematics could be expressed as a branch of set theory, and that
set theory could be axiomatized, and thus the proofs made rigorous and effectively checkable, in predicate
logic.
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a definition of each vocabulary item of T2, in such a way that within this augmentation
of T1 one can deduce all of T2; and of course (ii) vice versa. Thus (i) is called: making a
definitional extension of T1, and showing T2 to be (a sub theory of) a definitional extension
of T1. So: definitional equivalence is a matter of the two theories each being definitionally
extendable so as to ‘encompass’ the other. This is also called: their having a common
definitional extension.
It is clear, without revisiting the details of our Examples (1) to (3), that this notion of
definitional equivalence makes no difference to the Remark and Implication. And for the
now-familiar reason, viz. the logical framework deliberately sets aside intended meanings.
Thus suppose that the advocates, Alice and Bob, of such a pair of dual theories are
‘wise enough’ to use disjoint vocabularies. Nevertheless, their theories might well, once
formalized, be definitionally equivalent. Indeed, for a duality in the sense of our Schema,
their theories no doubt will be definitionally equivalent, if they could have been rendered
logically equivalent, by the argument of Section 5.2, had Alice and Bob used the same
vocabulary. Thus to repeat the Remark: despite the definitional equivalence, Alice and
Bob are still making different claims about the world!
Essentially the same point comes up in the literature on theoretical equivalence, re-
gardless of dualities. It is folklore among logicians that often, formal theories that they
(anyone!) would think of as very different are definitionally equivalent: in effect, because
the definitions added to one theory of the predicates etc. of the other are allowed to be
‘whatever it takes’ to deduce the theorems of the other theory. That is: the definitions
are not required to be ‘intuitive’ or to ‘respect meanings’. Hudetz (2016, Example 2;
2018, Proposition 4) gives an example which is striking, especially in the light of our
previous discussion. He points out that a formal theory of Minkowski spacetime (pos-
tulating the affine space of IR4, with a Minkowski interval) is definitionally equivalent
to a formal theory of Euclidean geometry for IR4. The reason is that they are each a
definitional extension of the theory of the real line IR. Roughly speaking: one ‘just’ uses
set theory to form appropriate n-tuples and to define an inner product with the desired
signature. Then each can be definitionally extended to ‘encompass’ the other. From
within Minkowski geometry, one defines a second inner product with completely positive
signature (+,+,+,+); and vice versa, from within Euclidean geometry.
This is striking in two ways. (i): It illustrates the general idea that any two definitional
extensions of a given theory that introduce different terms are definitionally equivalent
since they can each add the other’s definitions to yield a common definitional extension.
(ii): Recall Section 3.3’s example of two formulations of relativity theory with trivially
swapped conventions about +/− in the metric’s signature (used to emphasise that dual
theories might well agree utterly in their claims). Here, on the other hand, we naturally
think of definite vs. indefinite signature as encoding important geometric differences:
differences that the formal notion of definitional equivalence is blind to. Thus, taking
the two examples together, we have a striking illustration of how interpretation moulds
verdicts of theoretical equivalence.
Finally, I note that my Remark and Implication still hold good, beyond the case of
definitional equivalence. To be specific: Here are two other weakenings of logical equiva-
lence that have been proposed, and that have evident merits as explications of theoretical
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equivalence:—
(A): Generalized definitional equivalence. This generalizes, i.e. weakens, the
idea of definitional equivalence to deal with many-sorted logic: (Barrett and Halvorson
(2016, 2016a), who call it ‘Morita equivalence’). This generalization seems right, in that it
enables us to say, for example, that a formulation of Euclidean geometry based on points,
i.e. with points in the domains of its models, is equivalent to (‘the same theory as’) a
formulation based on lines: (Barrett and Halvorson (2017)).
(B): Categorical equivalence, i.e. equivalence of categories in the sense of cat-
egory theory. Note that this notion is defined for any two categories. So the broad idea
here is to argue that a scientific theory is best conceived as a category: the models of the
theory (in some sense of ‘model’ !) are the objects of the category, and the arrows of the
category are appropriate maps between models. This is not the place for details about
this broad idea: for which, cf. Halvorson and Tsementzis (2015), Weatherall (2015). I
shall just make three remarks.
(i): The broad idea is motivated by the difficulty, emphasised in (B) of Sec-
tion 5.2, of capturing physical theories adequately and perspicuously in formal languages,
especially with a first-order logic. For discussion, cf. e.g. Weatherall (2016: 1077, 1080:
discussions of his Criteria 1 and 1’).
(ii): On the syntactic conception of theory, the idea is take the objects to be
models in the sense of model theory, i.e. as in Section 5.2; and the arrows to be elementary
embeddings. It turns out that on this version, (A) implies (B) but not conversely: (cf.
Barrett and Halvorson 2016a, Sections 5 and 6, especially theorems 5.6, 5.7).
(iii): But the idea has also been applied to the semantic conception, i.e.
to physical theories formulated informally, as having a set of solutions. It applies very
naturally to spacetime theories, for which a solution is an entire spacetime equipped with
a dynamically possible history of matter and-or radiation fields: e.g. vacuum electromag-
netism in Minkowski spacetime. Indeed, each such solution is often called a ‘model’. The
set of solutions/models is then taken as the objects of the category, and the arrows of the
category are structure-preserving maps between models. This framework has the merit
of articulating in a precise way such topics as when one theory has ‘surplus structure’
compared with another. But this is not the place for details about this line of thought.
What matters for this paper is whether the Remark’s Implication still holds. As dis-
cussed: it is bound to hold for a notion of theoretical equivalence that is weaker than
logical equivalence—which definitional equivalence is; and so is (A); and so is (B), when
(B) is implemented on the syntactic conception of theory, as above. And the Implica-
tion still holds for the now-familiar reason: the definitions of theoretical equivalence, by
(A) and by (B) on the syntactic conception, are formal—they set aside intended meanings.
To sum up this Section: the Implication is worth emphasising just because:
(i): the drift of the literature on ‘theoretical equivalence’ is to weaken the notion
from the elementary conception of logical equivalence; while
(ii): the Implication of the Remark is that in some cases—indeed cases of dual
theories—logical equivalence is too weak. Its verdict ‘these theories are equivalent’ misses
the fact that the theories (as interpreted!) disagree with each other.
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6 Examples in string theory
6.1 The merits of advanced examples
So far in this paper, I have established the Remark and its Implication by using elementary
examples of our logically weak Schema of duality (Section 4). This situation prompts two
related questions, indeed doubts, one could have about what we have achieved.
(Q1): Using elementary examples prompts the question: Are there dualities in ad-
vanced physics that exemplify (Contr) or (Diff)—and might these duals, also, get formal-
ized so as to be logically equivalent? If so, the Remark and Implication are upheld. We
again conclude: logical equivalence and its weakenings are too weak as explications of
theoretical equivalence. But if not, one might suspect that the Remark and Implication
are of limited interest, an artefact of using elementary examples. And the suspicion is the
stronger because, as I have admitted, bosonization is not an example of (Contr) or (Diff).
(Q2): The Schema being logically weak prompts the question: Could we—should we—
strengthen the Schema, in such a way that cases of (Contr) and (Diff) are ruled out? Here,
the questioner must admit that adding to our Schema the requirements (i)-(iii) which we
set aside at the start of Section 4—that the duality isomorphism be non-obvious, logically
strong and scientifically important—will not rule out all cases of (Contr) and (Diff). For
even if you think these requirements rule out Examples (1) and (2): no one could deny
that Kramers-Wannier duality, and the other statistical mechanical dualities to which it
leads, i.e. Example (3) of (Diff), satisfy these requirements. But you might speculate
that there are other ways to strengthen the Schema, so as to rule out cases of (Contr)
and (Diff).
My answers to both questions is, in short:
(Q1): There are dualities in (very!) advanced physics, viz. string theory, that can
be taken as cases of (Contr), and perhaps there are also cases of (Diff): and for both sorts
of case, the duals might get formalized so as to be logically equivalent. Besides:
(Q2): These dualities amply satisfy the requirements (i)-(iii), of being non-obvious,
logically strong and scientifically important.20
In Sections 6.2 and 6.3, I justify my answer to (Q1) by briefly discussing gauge/gravity
duality and T-duality, respectively. (Even a brief discussion will make it clear that these
dualities are non-obvious, logically strong and scientifically important—so that my answer
to (Q2) needs no further justification.)
But before we start, I must admit to an important qualification. String theory is of
course a vast intellectual area. It is also speculative, not established, physics: both in the
sense that it lacks empirical confirmation, and in the sense that its conceptual framework
and technical formalism are not yet settled. Similarly for string dualities. This is a
vast subject, and most dualities are conjectural: though conjectured to be exact, not
approximate—and to be provable in a formalism that is, one hopes, over the next hill.
This situation suggests two criticisms of any project that tries to classify a string duality
20Admitted: you might yet speculate that there are other ways to strengthen the Schema, so as to
rule out cases of (Contr) and (Diff). But why search for them, instead of accepting that dualities can
exemplify (Contr) and (Diff)?
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in a philosopher’s neat pigeonholes, such as my (Contr) or (Diff):—
(i): It makes the project look premature. For in most cases, no one knows if in fact
the duality concerned holds. And even if it is known to hold in some specific case or cases
(given by judicious choices of spacetime dimensions and-or topology, and-or field content,
and-or subset of states and quantities), the sceptic may say that this specific case is not
of scientific interest—returning us to (Q1) above.21
(ii): It makes the project look naive: that is, naively realist about the string
theories we now have, or can reasonably hope soon to have. For, as is often said, string
theorists regard each of the string theories we now have as some sort of approximation
to a theory, dubbed ‘M-theory’, that we have yet to formulate: of which, they hope,
our present theories will be various regimes, or sectors. From this perspective, the main
scientific interest of the dualities between our present string theories lies in the hints they
give about how to formulate M-theory. (In fact, T-duality was a factor prompting the
idea of M-theory: Witten (1995).) This returns us to the heuristic function of dualities,
which this paper has set aside, especially since the warning, Beware, and footnote 10 of
Section 4.1. And as mentioned there: it is to be expected that M-theory—the theory
‘behind the duals’, as against their common core or bare theory—will render the dualities
between our present string theories approximate. Thus it can seem that my project of
classifying a string duality as to (Contr) or (Diff) ‘takes the duality too seriously’.
To these charges, I reply: ‘Guilty—but unrepentant!’ It is obvious from my endorse-
ment of intensional semantics (Section 3.1), and of construing subject-matters in terms
of partitions on a set of possible worlds, or physical states (Section 3.2), that my overall
outlook in logic and ontology is robustly realist. And I aspire to be a scientific realist,
drawing my world-picture, albeit fallibly, from our mature scientific theories. Agreed:
these overall outlooks are contentious—but I cannot defend them here. And agreed: for
theories that are not established, and not even in their final formulation, the results drawn
from interpreting them in this robustly realist manner, can only be tentative and fallible.
But, say I: nonetheless worth stating.22 So in this tentative and fallibilist spirit, I proceed
...
6.2 (6): Gauge/gravity duality
‘Gauge/gravity duality’ is the umbrella term for dualities between a string theory (hence
including a description of gravity) on a D-dimensional spacetime (the ‘bulk’) and a quan-
tum field theory (a gauge theory, with no description of gravity) on a (D−1)-dimensional
space or spacetime that forms the bulk’s boundary. The original, best understood, and
best confirmed (though still conjectural) example is between a type IIB string theory on
a ten-dimensional spacetime, with five dimensional anti-de Sitter (‘AdS’) spacetime as a
factor, and a certain conformal field theory (‘CFT’: viz. N = 4 super-Yang Mills theory)
on its boundary. So this example is called ‘AdS/CFT’: an acronym which is also used for
21Here is another collision of jargon: such a ‘case’ or ‘set of judicious choices’ is usually called a ‘model’,
as in ‘sigma-model’, ‘XY-model’, or indeed ‘Ising model’. More important: string theory can boast a few
such cases of rigorous dualities: cf. footnote 23.
22For a more nuanced rationale for interpreting theories that are not established, I recommend Huggett
and Wu¨thrich (2013: Section 3).
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the general idea.
Obviously, I cannot here survey, even cursorily, this cluster of ideas. Let me just say:
(1): About the desiderata that a duality should be non-obvious and scientifically
important:— To glimpse the non-obviousness, note that the duality maps (ds, dq of Section
2.2: the dictionary in physicists’ jargon) pair some very disparate items. For example:
the bulk’s radial spatial coordinate (i.e. the coordinate orthogonal to the boundary) gets
mapped to the energy scale of the boundary theory. (There are also some notions that
get paired with themselves, i.e. ‘the dictionary respects synonymy’: which, surrounded
by such disparate pairings, is itself striking. For example, temperature in the bulk gets
mapped to temperature in the boundary.) The duality is also useful: problems that are
difficult, because strongly coupled, in the boundary theory are mapped into easier, weakly
coupled, problems in the bulk.
(2): For introductions from a physics perspective, cf. e.g. Horowitz and Polchinski
(2006), Polchinski (2017, Section 4), De Haro et al. (2016). There are several recent
philosophical discussions. We can distinguish four topics.
(i): Rickles (2013), Teh (2013), Dieks et al. (2015) and De Haro (2017) focus on
the suggestion prompted by gauge/gravity duality, that gravity or spacetime is emergent.
(ii): De Haro and others have analysed the relation between duality and gauge
symmetry, especially in connection with gauge/gravity duality (De Haro et al. (2016)):
which depends on a subtle analysis (De Haro (2017a)) of boundary conditions, about the
conditions for a symmetry on one side of the duality to be ‘visible’ from the other side.
(iii): Closer to this paper’s concerns, and using its Schema for duality: De Haro
(2016: Section 2.1; 2016a Section 2.2) has addressed the question what is the common
core i.e. bare theory, of which the bulk and boundary theories are models (i.e. mod-
els in our representation-theory sense from Sections 2.1 and 2.2)—especially as regards
spacetime concepts. In short, he argues that in the bare theory, the spacetime is the
(D − 1)-dimensional boundary manifold equipped—not with a metric, but merely—with
an equivalence class of them, under local conformal transformations.
(iv): Finally, there is precisely this paper’s concern: Do the duals agree? In De
Haro’s jargon: are they physically equivalent? As I reported at the end of Section 1.2, sev-
eral authors say ‘Yes’. (For some of the quotations I gave there are about gauge/gravity
duality, at least in part.)
The denouement is clear. I say ‘No’; or more modestly: ‘Saying ‘No’ is tenable’.
My reason is straightforward. Indeed, it returns us to my first example of the Remark,
Example (1) in Section 4.1.
Imagine we had a rigorous proof of some specific gauge/gravity duality. Suppose the
bulk theory (the ‘left dual’) says spacetime is five-dimensional (D = 5); so the boundary
theory, the right dual, says it is is four-dimensional. But both theories are putative ‘the-
ories of everything’, ‘toy cosmologies’. They are both about a single topic, the cosmos;
in philosophers’ jargon, the actual world. So the theories make contrary assertions about
that single topic, the actual world, namely about the dimension of its spacetime. So this
is a case of (Contr). In terms of the simple logic—or rhetoric!—of the situation, we have
come full circle, back to Example (1), with its contrary specifications of absolute rest in
Newtonian gravitation; and with noteworthy Features 1) and 2)—a ‘toy cosmology’ with
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a complete set of states in each dual.
Five points in clarification and support of this verdict: (1), (2) and (5) are the most
important. (5) returns us to the contrast between the heuristic function of dualities, and
the present project of interpreting dualities as now formulated.
(1): Of course, saying that the duals are both about the cosmos, the actual world,
does not commit me to either of them being actually true. For nor does Section 4.1’s
verdict that Example (1) illustrates (Contr) commit me to Newtonian gravitation, with
some or other specification of absolute rest, being actually true. I mean ‘about’ the cos-
mos in the sense of ‘referring’ to it (having it as ‘the target system’, in an ugly current
jargon); not ‘describing it accurately’.
(2): Agreed: there is an important contrast between Example (1) and this Exam-
ple. Example (1) had a single ‘knob’ whose ‘setting’ specified an absolute rest, and so
one of the duals, without anything else being affected. So it was easy to take the duals as
rival ‘toy cosmologies’ about the single actual world. But here, the two descriptions are
so different—a D-dimensional world with gravity vs. a (D − 1)-dimensional one without
gravity, but with conformal invariance—that one naturally says they are about different
subject-matters or topics. (After all, the literature never calls the conformal field the-
ories, and other quantum field theories that are boundary theories, ‘cosmologies’: they
are theories of certain non-gravitational interactions between quantum particles.) But
obviously, this is just a matter of what one means by ‘subject-matter’ or ‘topic’: and this
usage says nothing against Section 3.2’s other (equally natural) usage of ‘subject-matter’
as a taxonomy, i.e. a partition of a set of possibilities/ possible worlds. Cf. also (5) below.
(3): I agree that my ‘So the theories make contrary...’ implicitly assumes that the
cosmos has only one spacetime, with a unique dimension—it cannot be both 5 and 4.
This is, I take it, part of what is meant by each of the bulk and boundary theories being
a putative cosmology, so that there is no question of either dual countenancing that the
system (‘sector of reality’) it describes is one of a number of such systems /sectors. Note
the contrast with our Examples (2) and (3) of (Diff): for position-momentum duality,
there can be two quantum particles on distinct (non-intersecting) lines, and for Kramers-
Wannier duality, there can be two Ising lattices.
(4): Agreed: one could redefine ‘cosmos’ so as to allow a cosmos to comprise two or
more mutually disconnected spacetime manifolds, whose dimensions could differ. In which
case, one such cosmos might include a five-dimensional manifold accurately described by
our duality’s bulk theory, and a four-dimensional manifold accurately described by its
boundary theory. But this would simply turn the duals’ disagreement into a case of
(Diff), like Examples (2) and (3), rather than (Contr).
(5): I agree that, faced with the proven duality, there is a temptation or impulse
to ‘quotient’. That is: either
(i) to formulate the duals’ common core, the bare theory (if we have no formu-
lation or a defective or unperspicuous one), and-or
(ii) to formulate another theory ‘behind the duals’, of which they are approxi-
mations, not representations.
In short, to say: ‘the real truth lies in what is in common, or what is behind, the two
duals’. This is indeed the heuristic function of dualities, first discussed in the warning,
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Beware of Section 4.1: and noted for string theory at the end of Section 6.1. Recall the
analogous temptation for Example (1): either
(i) to move to Galilean (neoNewtonian) spacetime, or
(ii) to move to geometrized gravity, such as in general relativity.
So I of course agree that this temptation is worthy: scientifically, heuristically, valuable—
and accordingly stressed by physicists’ discussions. But we must not let this temptation,
oriented to the further development of our theories, distort the activity of interpreting
the theories as now formulated. We can put this in terms of De Haro’s notions of in-
ternal and external interpretations, as follows. Having the imagined proof of the specific
gauge/gravity duality does not ipso facto give us an internal interpretation, since the proof
will use the current external interpretations, which as De Haro (2016a, Section 2.2) says
‘are of course completely different in the two formulations of the theory: [for example] on
the gravity side, the [boundary] manifold M is the boundary of a D-dimensional manifold
with a metric which can vary; whereas M is a manifold in the QFT with a fixed metric.’
Thus a statement of the bare theory, and an internal interpretation, are not automatic,
given a proven duality. They are not just over the next hill. And so the duals as now
formulated give a case of (Contr): just as Newton and Clarke would have said in Example
(1).
6.3 (7): T-duality
‘T-duality’ is the umbrella term for two dualities between two pairs of string theories (as
currently formulated): one pair called ‘type II’ and the other ‘heterotic’. Both dualities
involve inverting the radius of one of the compact dimensions of space: (for string theories
require several more dimensions than four, so that each theory takes the extra dimensions
to be compact, ‘curled up’ like a circle). Thus a type IIA theory postulating that a certain
dimension of space has radius R is dual to a type IIB theory where the dimension is 1/R.
(Here, my ‘1’ suppresses a constant.) Similarly for heterotic theories; but we can focus
on just one case, say the type II case.
There is an obvious objection to this idea—which has been addressed. The objection
is that if one theory, say a type IIA theory, postulates a radius R so small that it could
not be empirically detected, 1/R may well be so large that it could be detected, i.e. could
be detected if it was real. And since, ‘looking around us’, we do not see detectably large
compact dimensions, we should infer that the dual type IIB theory is disconfirmed, while
the type IIA theory is not. So surely the duality is broken: the dual theories are not
empirically equivalent, let alone fully theoretically equivalent in the way that duals are
meant to be.
However, there is a reply to this objection: or at least, a consensus among string
theorists how to reply! Again I cannot here survey, even cursorily, this large topic. It
must suffice to say that if one analyses an archetypal measurement of the radius of a
putative compact dimension—say by sending off a particle of known velocity, e.g. a
photon, and timing how long it takes to return from its journey—one can argue that the
result can be naturally accommodated by both dual theories. This is essentially because
what one dual describes as a journey through physical space, the space described by
familiar physics (and everyday thought and language), is described by the other dual as
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a journey through an internal space (called ‘winding space’). This kind of analysis goes
back to Brandenberger and Vafa (1989, Section 2); cf. also A´lvarez et al. (1995: Section
6). For philosophers, a masterly exposition is Huggett (2017: 83, and 84: ‘interpretation
one’), whom I have followed.
Thus I shall take it that this objection can be laid to rest; so that in T-duality,
the dual theories are indeed empirically equivalent in a very strong sense—‘theoretically
equivalent’, as they say! That is: the duals agree about the values of ‘all’ quantities in
‘all’ states, in the manner of eq 6 (Section 2.2). So I can now face my main question. Do
the duals agree in my sense: or do they disagree, either as (Contr) or as (Diff)? In De
Haro’s and Huggett’s jargon: are they physically equivalent?23
This question seems to have attracted less attention from philosophers than the parallel
question about gauge/gravity duality, in Section 6.2. But at least two authors say: ‘they
agree’. Namely, Rickles (2011: 61; 2013a, 61; though cf. his footnote 14) and, in a much
more detailed analysis, Huggett (2017: 85-87, Section 2.2). Indeed, we glimpsed Huggett’s
views, in (c) at the end of Section 1.2, and in (2)(i) of Section 2.3. Thus he first notes, in
connection with harmonic oscillator duality, that the two duals are physically inequivalent
(in my jargon: disagree) because we can independently measure e.g. the mass by means
that go beyond the oscillator, or our model of it. Then he writes:
But the case is disanalogous to string theory, if that is taken as a theory of
everything ... consider a world in which the harmonic oscillator is the complete
physical description, so that there is no more encompassing theory by which
mass or the spatial amplitude of oscillation could be uniquely determined. ...
do we now say ... the parameters such as mass that differentiate the duals ...
distinguish two distinct physical possibilities, which nevertheless agree on the
values of all observables?
[He concedes that it] would not be a logical fallacy, nor [contravene] unavoid-
able semantic or ontological principles, [to deny that] the duals describe the
same physical possibility. [But ...] from a practical scientific point of view, it
makes sense to treat those differences as non-physical ... long established well-
motivated scientific reasoning should lead us to think that dual total theories
represent the same physical situation (2017: 86).
Obviously, I beg to differ: along lines closely parallel to those in the denouement of
Section 6.2. That is: I interpret the duals as both being about a single topic: the cosmos,
the actual world. They make contrary assertions about this topic. So they disagree: a
case of (Contr). Besides, Section 6.2’s five points of clarification and support carry over
with trivial changes of wording: disagreement over the value of a spatial radius replaces
disagreement over the number of spatial dimensions. In particular, point (5)’s diagnosis,
23Besides, my question is less premature and-or naively realist than the accusations at the end of
Section 6.1 might suggest. For thanks to the fact that T-duality does not exchange weak and strong
coupling (though it does exchange large and small spatial radius), it can be proven order-by-order in
string perturbation theory. This means that, broadly speaking, its status as ‘established’ or ‘proven’ is
no worse than any perturbative results in a quantum field theory. Besides, there are rigorous proofs,
within topological string theory, of mirror symmetry: of which T-duality is a special case, but for a richer
theory. My thanks to Sebastian De Haro for these points.
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that the literature misses my Remark, because of its focus on the heuristic function of
dualities, carries over. But to avoid repeating myself, I just invite the reader to check
that the five points carry over.
Finally, I should make two supplementary remarks. The first is about Huggett’s views;
the second about distinguishing types of string theory—which will take us back to Section
6.2’s (3) and (4).
(i): In fairness to Huggett, I should report that after he says the duals agree, he
goes on to address the pressing question that results: how can we make sense of the
‘appearance’ that the dual theories contradict each other about the radius of space? He
distinguishes two answers, called ‘interpretation one’ (p. 84) and ‘interpretation two’ (p.
85). In short: the first says that (some of) the words must be given different interpre-
tations on the two sides: which interpretations, and for which words, being judiciously
chosen so as to compensate for the apparent contradiction, i.e. chosen so that the duals
in fact agree. So the appearance that the dual theories contradict each other is a mistake
due to homonymy. On the other hand, the second says that each word is given the same
interpretation on the two sides; and then it saves Huggett’s initial claim, that the duals
are physically equivalent, by maintaining that the duals’ contradiction is about unphys-
ical topics. Huggett ends (p. 87) by favouring the second, his ‘interpretation two’. My
reply to all this is that I find Huggett’s discussion admirably sensible: but of course, I do
not need to answer his pressing question—to choose between his interpretation one and
interpretation two. For my simple verdict, (Contr), avoids the question.
(ii): So far, I have suppressed the fact that T-duality holds between different string
theories, e.g. a type IIA and a type IIB. (As does Huggett.) If these are treated as the-
ories of everything (TOEs, ‘toy cosmologies’), as string theories usually are, then they
are incompatible; and so we have a case of (Contr)—parallel to the discussion in Section
6.2’s point (3). On the other hand, I agree that maybe one could treat such theories, not
as TOEs, but as both true in a single cosmos/possible world with, say a 10-dimensional
space: namely by having the type IIA describe one compact dimension as radius R, and
the type IIB describe another compact dimension as radius 1/R. This would simply turn
the duals’ disagreement into a case of (Diff) rather than (Contr)—just like in Section 6.2’s
point (4).
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